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Exploiting Regulatory Inconsistencies 
Emily Cauble 
Abstract 
In many instances, sophisticated parties exploit inconsistencies 
between regulatory regimes to achieve beneficial treatment under 
each regime by obtaining classification under one regime that is, at 
least superficially, inconsistent with classification under the other 
regime. For instance, parties might design an instrument that is 
treated as “debt” for tax purposes, but “equity” for purposes of 
capital requirements instituted by financial regulators. 
This Article asks whether exploiting regulatory inconsistencies 
is problematic. This Article concludes that inconsistency, in and of 
itself, is not necessarily a problem. Different regulatory regimes 
might classify a transaction differently when doing so best serves 
the unique goals of each regime. However, in other cases, 
inconsistency could be a byproduct of inaccurate classification by at 
least one regulatory regime. In such cases, the relevant regulator 
needs to reconsider its classification scheme. 
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I. Introduction 
In many instances, sophisticated parties exploit 
inconsistencies between regulatory regimes to achieve beneficial 
treatment under each regime by obtaining classification under one 
regime that is, at least superficially, inconsistent with 
classification under the other regime.1 For instance, parties might 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Part II.A (presenting examples of transactions that are treated 
inconsistently by different regulatory regimes). Exploiting regulatory 
inconsistencies represents a subset of what Professor Fleischer labeled 
“regulatory arbitrage.” Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
227, 244 (2010). Professor Fleischer defined regulatory arbitrage to include not 
only transactions in which parties exploit regulatory inconsistencies (which he 
labeled “regulatory regime inconsistency”), but also transactions in which parties 
exploit “economic substance inconsistency” (which occurs when “two transactions 
with identical cash flows receive different regulatory treatment under the same 
regulatory regime”) and transactions in which parties exploit “time inconsistency” 
(which occurs when “the same transaction receives different regulatory treatment 
in the future than it does today”). Id. In this Article, I examine only the first 
category of transactions because they may raise unique concerns. In particular, it 
is the only type of regulatory arbitrage in which sophisticated parties can obtain 
the best of both worlds—obtaining tax benefits and benefits under a non-tax 
regulatory regime by claiming inconsistent treatment across the two regimes. 
Because the ability of sophisticated parties to have their tax cake and their 
non-tax icing might strike some as particularly distasteful, it is worthwhile to 
analyze whether this particular inconsistency is problematic and consider what 
steps could be taken to address it when it is problematic. 
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design an instrument that is treated as “debt” for tax purposes, but 
“equity” for purposes of state usury law (or, perhaps, “equity” for 
purposes of capital requirements instituted by financial 
regulators).2 Parties might engage in a transaction that allows 
recognition of losses for tax purposes, but does not require 
recognition of losses for bank regulatory purposes.3 
Intuitively, this type of behavior strikes many as 
disconcerting. Sophisticated parties are able to achieve the best of 
both worlds and avoid adverse treatment under multiple 
regulatory regimes by classifying a transaction differently for 
purposes of each regime.4 The inconsistencies inherent in these 
transactions are the features that may seem particularly vexing.5 
We might assume that a sophisticated party would design a 
financial instrument to more closely resemble either debt or 
equity, according to which would lead to the most favorable overall 
outcome, taking into account all applicable regulatory regimes, 
business considerations, and other factors. However, if the 
instrument were designed so that it were “debt” for purposes of tax 
law, but “equity” for purposes of capital requirements imposed by 
bank regulators, we might be troubled by the sophisticated party’s 
ability to have their tax cake and their bank regulatory icing too, 
having achieved this outcome by taking positions that are, at least 
superficially, inconsistent. 
Although planning by sophisticated parties may be troubling 
for a number of reasons,6 as this Article will argue, the 
inconsistency inherent in these transactions, in and of itself, is not 
                                                                                                     
 2. See infra Part II.A (discussing how a taxpayer might issue an instrument 
treated as debt for tax purposes and as equity for capital requirements purposes 
or state usury law purposes). 
 3. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text (recounting how during the 
1980s savings and loan crisis, thrift institutions, holding suddenly devalued 
mortgages, swapped substantially similar bundles of interests in mortgages to 
report losses for tax purposes without needing to report the losses for regulatory 
purposes); see also Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 556–57 (1991) 
(holding that a financial institution realizes tax-deductible losses when it swaps 
interests in a group of residential mortgage loans with other lenders). 
 4. See infra Parts II.A–B (providing examples of inconsistent treatment 
between regulatory schemes and explaining how such inconsistencies occur). 
 5. See infra Part II.B (pointing out multiple causes of such inconsistencies). 
 6. See infra Part III (explaining that tax planning may be problematic for 
a number of reasons). 
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necessarily problematic.7 Because different regulatory regimes 
might serve different purposes, classifying a transaction 
differently under each regime might not be a true inconsistency.8 
In other words, something could be “debt” for tax purposes, but 
“equity” for state usury law purposes if the state usury laws have 
good reason to mean something different by “debt” than what is 
meant in the tax context.9 However, in some cases, inconsistency 
could be a byproduct of underlying failings in one or more of the 
regulatory regimes.10 For instance, the inconsistency in the 
preceding example would be problematic if state usury laws do not, 
in fact, have good reason to mean something different by “debt” 
than what is meant in the tax context.  
In other words, inconsistent labels alone do not necessarily 
indicate that anything is amiss. Rather, each regulator must take 
care to ensure that a given transaction’s classification is correct 
under the regime that it administers, a fact which would be true 
even if the transaction were not treated inconsistently by another 
regime. 
Exploitation of regulatory inconsistencies could also be 
problematic because it reduces “frictions” against tax planning. 
“Frictions” against tax planning are non-tax costs that a taxpayer 
must bear in order to obtain a more favorable tax outcome.11 
Because of frictions, taxpayers will sometimes abandon attempts 
to structure their transactions to avoid adverse tax treatment if 
such structuring would result in undesirable accounting 
treatment, adverse non-tax regulatory treatment, or a sub-optimal 
                                                                                                     
 7. See infra Part III (explaining how inconsistency may not be problematic 
when the different regimes serve different purposes). 
 8. See infra Part III (defining a “true inconsistency” as one between how 
the transaction is treated under one regime and how it should be treated); Jordan 
Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 69, 75 (2010) (“The 
difference in treatment between regimes is an indicator that one of the regulatory 
regimes may be treating them inappropriately, but the difference in treatment is 
not a problem in and of itself.”). 
 9. See infra Part III (explaining that differing classifications between two 
regimes may be based on differing policy goals); Fleischer, supra note 1, at 244 
(providing examples of diverging policy goals and how those impact the meaning 
given to the same terms by two different regulatory regimes). 
 10. See infra Part IV (explaining how incorrect classification under one or 
more regimes could lead to problematic inconsistencies in treatment). 
 11. See infra Part V.A (providing an overview of existing literature regarding 
“frictions” against tax planning). 
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business outcome.12 The ability of sophisticated parties to obtain 
favorably different treatment under multiple regulatory regimes 
can nullify the effects of otherwise potent frictions against tax 
planning.13 However, as this Article will argue, reliance on another 
regulatory regime as the source of friction could lead to arbitrary 
outcomes if the other regulatory regime classifies transactions in a 
manner unrelated to the goals of tax law.14 Such outcomes are not 
ideal. 
An existing body of literature discusses both frictions against 
tax planning and the neutralization of those frictions by taxpayers’ 
ability to obtain inconsistent treatment across regulatory 
regimes.15 To the existing literature, this Article adds several key 
insights. First, this Article demonstrates that because of the 
structure of several tax doctrines, potential non-tax regulatory 
frictions against tax planning are not merely neutralized in some 
instances.16 Rather, obtaining a beneficial non-tax regulatory 
outcome can actually increase the chances of obtaining a beneficial 
tax outcome.17 Second, this Article argues that the usefulness of a 
non-tax regulatory regime as a friction will depend on whether the 
goals of the non-tax regulatory regime are aligned with the goals 
of tax law.18 Third, this Article provides examples to demonstrate 
the process that regulators might follow when determining 
whether inconsistent treatment is or is not appropriate in various 
cases.19 
                                                                                                     
 12. See infra Part V.A (discussing the ability of frictions to inhibit tax 
planning). 
 13. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the “malleability” of 
a friction and its implications for taxpayer behavior). 
 14. See infra Part V.B (describing arbitrary outcomes that may arise). 
 15. See infra Part V.A (providing an overview of the existing literature on 
frictions). 
 16. See infra Part II.C (describing how, in some instances, obtaining a 
favorable outcome under a non-tax regime can increase the chances of obtaining 
a favorable tax outcome). 
 17. See infra Part II.C (describing how, in some instances, obtaining a 
favorable outcome under a non-tax regime can increase the chances of obtaining 
a favorable tax outcome). 
 18. See infra Part V.B (discussing the arbitrary outcomes that could arise if 
a non-tax regulatory regime with goals that diverged from the goals of tax law 
were used as a friction against tax planning). 
 19. See infra Part IV (describing instances in which inconsistent treatment 
is or is not appropriate). 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides examples of 
sophisticated parties obtaining beneficial, and seemingly 
inconsistent, treatment across regulatory regimes. It also 
illustrates how, in some cases, achieving a favorable non-tax 
regulatory result can heighten the odds of attaining a positive tax 
outcome. Part III presents the argument that inconsistency, in and 
of itself, may not be problematic because different regulatory 
regimes can serve different goals. Part IV illustrates how, in some 
cases, inconsistency could be a byproduct of a failing in one or more 
of the regulatory regimes. Finally, Part V addresses the effect of 
inconsistent treatment on frictions against tax planning. 
II. Taxpayers Who Get the Best of Both Worlds 
By treating a transaction differently for purposes of different 
regulatory regimes, a regulated party can potentially reap benefits 
under each regime. First, this Part will present examples of 
inconsistent treatment.20 Second, it will explain how inconsistency 
arises.21 Finally, as the existing literature on frictions recognizes, 
in many cases, parties utilize tax planning to obtain favorable tax 
outcomes despite seemingly inconsistent and favorable non-tax 
regulatory results.22 Subpart II.C will describe how, in some cases, 
parties obtain beneficial tax outcomes through planning because of 
the fact that they attained favorable non-tax regulatory results. 
A. Examples of Inconsistent Treatment 
A bank might issue a preferred stock instrument with enough 
debt-like features that it could be treated as “debt” for tax 
purposes, but “equity” for purposes of capital requirements 
instituted by financial regulators. This treatment, which would be 
inconsistent at least on its face, would provide the owners of the 
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra Part II.A (providing examples of inconsistent treatment in the 
context of classifying an instrument as debt or equity). 
 21. See infra Part II.B (describing various causes of inconsistency). 
 22. See infra Part V.A (discussing how the ability to obtain favorable 
outcomes under multiple regimes can nullify the effects of otherwise potent 
frictions against tax planning). 
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bank’s common stock with the best of both worlds.23 From a tax 
perspective, “debt” treatment is preferable to “equity” treatment,24 
and, from a capital requirements perspective, “equity” 
classification is superior to “debt” classification.25 
In terms of the tax outcome, if the instrument were considered 
debt for tax purposes, the bank would be entitled to deduct interest 
expense, but if the instrument were considered equity for tax 
purposes, the bank would not be entitled to any deduction for 
payments made on the instrument.26 Therefore, debt treatment 
would be desirable because the interest deduction would reduce 
the bank’s tax burden. On the other hand, for purposes of bank 
capital requirements, equity classification is more advantageous 
than debt classification. A bank is required to maintain a 
minimum ratio of “tier one capital” to assets.27 If the instrument 
were classified as equity for purposes of this requirement, the 
instrument might constitute “tier one capital,” and the bank could 
issue this instrument in lieu of issuing additional common stock.28 
                                                                                                     
 23. See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text (describing the advantages 
of classifying an instrument in this manner). 
 24. In most cases, debt treatment is more advantageous than equity 
treatment from a tax perspective. In some cases, however, a taxpayer could prefer 
equity treatment. For instance, assume a tax-exempt entity owned an instrument 
issued by an entity that was treated as a partnership for tax purposes. Assume 
the partnership engaged in activity that generated unrelated business taxable 
income. If the partnership is profitable, the tax-exempt entity may prefer that the 
instrument is classified as debt for tax purposes so that it earns interest income 
that is generally not subject to tax under the unrelated business income tax. If 
the partnership generates losses, then the tax-exempt entity may prefer for the 
instrument to be treated as equity for tax purposes so that it is allocated losses 
that it could deduct against other unrelated business taxable income. See I.R.C. 
§ 512(c) (2012) (describing the tax treatment of a tax-exempt organization that is 
a partner in a partnership). 
 25. See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (describing the advantages 
of this classification). 
 26. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 4.01[2] (6th ed. 2000) (“Section 163(a) allows 
the payor corporation to deduct ‘all interest paid or accrued within the taxable 
year on indebtedness,’ but no comparable deduction is allowed for distributions to 
the corporation’s shareholders.” (quoting I.R.C. § 163(a) (2000))). 
 27. See Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical 
Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 650–51 (2012) (discussing requirements for banks, 
including the maintenance of minimum leverage ratios, calculated by “dividing 
tier 1 capital . . . by the bank’s total assets”). 
 28. See id. at 651 (defining tier one capital as “essentially common stock, 
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If the return on the preferred stock issued by the bank were limited 
and if the bank were sufficiently profitable, then the owners of the 
common stock would be better off than they would have been had 
the bank been required to issue additional common stock that 
would have diluted their return.29 
Likewise, a corporation might issue an instrument treated as 
“debt” for tax purposes, but “equity” for purposes of state usury 
laws.30 From a tax standpoint, debt characterization is more 
favorable because it allows the corporation to benefit from an 
interest deduction.31 If the yield on the instrument would violate 
state usury laws, then equity characterization for usury law 
purposes would be more favorable because the instrument would 
not be subject to state usury laws.32  
B. How Inconsistency Arises 
Sometimes, inconsistency across regulatory regimes might 
arise because one regime is more substance-based while the other 
is more form-driven.33 For instance, in some cases, state usury laws 
might adopt a form-driven approach, classifying instruments as 
debt or equity based on the labels assigned by the parties.34 At the 
same time, tax law employs a substance-based approach to 
classification that involves examining the economic features of an 
                                                                                                     
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in the equity 
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries”). 
 29. See id. at 649 (explaining how banks can increase their stockholders 
return on equity by increasing their leverage). 
 30. See Jones Syndicate v. Comm’r, 23 F.2d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1927) 
(concluding that “a taxpayer who borrows money at a usurious rate of interest 
and who, to conceal the usury, is compelled to execute a document which does not 
correctly describe the relationship of the parties, may, as against the government, 
disclose the true relationship of debtor and creditor”). 
 31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting I.R.C. § 163(a) allows 
a tax deduction for interest). 
 32. See Jones Syndicate, 23 F.2d at 835 (discussing the interaction of equity 
characterization and state usury laws). 
 33. See Barry, supra note 8, at 73 (“[R]egulatory arbitrage is a phenomenon 
that follows from having regulations that fail to take economic reality into 
account.”). 
 34. See infra note 109 and accompanying text (positing that this form-driven 
approach was at work in both Jones Syndicate and Commissioner v. Bollinger). 
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instrument and other factors.35 Therefore, tax-usury law 
inconsistency could arise if an instrument were labeled “equity,” 
but had debt-like economic features.  
In other cases, inconsistency could arise even when both 
regimes are substance-based.36 This could occur because the 
regimes prioritize different factors or because factors that were 
relevant for purposes of one could be irrelevant for purposes of the 
other. For instance, as discussed below, a substance-based 
classification scheme for state usury law purposes might focus 
mainly on the extent to which the holder of the instrument has a 
claim that was subordinate to the claims held by others.37 The 
substance-based classification scheme used for tax purposes takes 
into account subordination, but also examines many other 
factors.38 
Sometimes, inconsistent treatment is actively encouraged by 
one of the regulators.39 For example, during the 1980s savings and 
loan crisis, a number of thrift institutions held mortgages that had 
                                                                                                     
 35. See infra Part IV.A (cataloguing the substantive factors that may be 
considered). 
 36. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that even when both regimes are 
substance-based, the relevant substance might not be the same under both 
regimes). 
 37. See infra Part IV.B (asserting that for purposes of a state usury law 
regime that examined substance, a claim subordinated to all other claims would 
be considered equity). 
 38. See infra Parts IV.A–B (listing additional factors relevant to the tax 
classification of an instrument as debt or equity). 
 39. Sometimes, inconsistent treatment also arises as a result of lobbying of 
the regulators by the regulated parties. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as a 
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1338 n.85 (2001) 
[B]anks petitioned the Federal Reserve to designate so called 
trust-preferred securities as “tier one” capital. These securities were 
eligible for a tax deduction, but their debt-like features rendered them, 
at least initially, an insufficiently reliable source of core capital for 
regulated banks. Eventually, though, the Federal Reserve relaxed its 
standards enough to offer these securities a “tier one” designation. 
The classification of trust preferred securities as “tier one” capital, however, has 
been phased out by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act. See, e.g., Candemir Baltali & Joseph Tanega, Basel III: Dehybridization of 
Capital, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 43 (2011) (“Given Dodd-Frank Act’s § 171, 
neither trust preferred securities nor cumulative perpetual preferred stock would 
qualify for inclusion as tier 1 capital among the top 50 [bank holding 
companies].”). 
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fallen drastically in value.40 The thrift institutions had issued the 
loans at low, fixed interest rates, and market interest rates had 
risen substantially.41 As a result, the loans had declined in value 
significantly.42 The thrift institutions would benefit from realizing 
the resulting losses for tax purposes, because doing so would allow 
the institutions to deduct the losses, lowering their taxable income 
and tax liability.43 However, reporting the losses for accounting 
purposes (rather than continuing to report the loans as worth their 
original value) could result in many of the thrift institutions being 
subject to closure by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.44 In 
order to enable the institutions to realize the losses for tax 
purposes, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board issued a 
memorandum describing a way in which thrift institutions could 
swap substantially similar bundles of interests in mortgages 
without being required to report the losses for regulatory 
purposes.45 Thrift institutions engaged in the swaps and reported 
the losses for tax purposes.46 The IRS challenged the losses claimed 
by one of the institutions, and the Supreme Court held that the 
losses were realized for tax purposes.47 
Sometimes, inconsistent treatment might arise not because 
the regulatory regimes lead to different outcomes, but because one 
or more of the regimes is under-enforced. That is, parties 
sometimes might claim inconsistent treatment in cases in which 
their claim could be successfully challenged under one or more of 
the regimes, if the regulator or regulators enforced the relevant 
requirements. 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 556 (1991) (“Cottage 
Savings held numerous long-term, low-interest mortgages that declined in value 
when interest rates surged in the late 1970’s.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 557. 
 45. See id. at 557 (“The FHLBB’s acknowledged purpose for Memorandum 
R-49 was to facilitate transactions that would generate tax losses but that would 
not substantially affect the economic position of the transacting S & L’s.”). 
 46. Id. at 557–58. 
 47. Id. at 558. 
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C. Rather than Limiting Tax Planning, Efforts to Obtain 
Favorable Non-Tax Regulatory Outcomes 
Sometimes Facilitate Tax Planning 
As discussed below, others have noted that, in some cases, 
taxpayers’ aims to achieve favorable results under non-tax 
regulatory regimes can serve as “frictions” against tax planning.48 
“Frictions” against tax planning are non-tax costs that a taxpayer 
must bear in order to obtain a more favorable tax outcome.49 
Because of such frictions, taxpayers will sometimes abandon 
attempts to structure their transactions to avoid adverse tax 
treatment if such structuring would result in undesirable 
accounting treatment, adverse non-tax regulatory treatment, or a 
sub-optimal business outcome.50 
The ability of sophisticated parties to simultaneously obtain 
favorable treatment under multiple regulatory regimes can nullify 
the effects of otherwise potent frictions against tax planning.51 In 
fact, the state of affairs is even more favorable to taxpayers in some 
cases. In particular, because of the structure of various tax rules, 
in some cases the potential “friction” role of a non-tax regulatory 
regime is not merely nullified—rather obtaining a favorable result 
under a non-tax regime can grease the wheels of tax planning. 
That is, obtaining a favorable non-tax outcome actually increases 
the chances of obtaining a favorable tax outcome. 
                                                                                                     
 48. Infra Part V.A. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 244–47 (describing “regulatory 
regime inconsistency”); Schizer, supra note 39, at 1324 
[T]he “malleability” of a friction—is often crucial. For example, 
corporate taxpayers often care about the earnings reported to 
shareholders, so financial accounting is a “strong” friction. To maintain 
impressive reported earnings, corporate managers may well abandon 
a transaction that offers a tax benefit but also would depress earnings. 
Issuance of a simple debt security, for instance, creates interest 
expense that is tax deductible but also would reduce earnings. But 
what if the best of both worlds is available? Can the deal be tweaked 
so the expense no longer depresses accounting earnings, but still 
generates a tax deduction? If so, the accounting friction is malleable 
and will not stop the tax planning. 
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To illustrate this, consider the Non-Disavowal Doctrine.52 In 
tax cases, the genuine substance of a transaction will often 
triumph over the transaction’s mere form for purposes of 
determining the transaction’s tax consequences.53 Despite this 
principle, a taxpayer often will be bound to the transactional form 
that he or she selects.54 Courts’ rejection of taxpayers’ attempts to 
                                                                                                     
 52. See Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer’s Right to 
Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137, 138 (1990) (defining the 
Non-Disavowal Principle as “the classic statement that a taxpayer may not assert 
the substance over form principle”); see also Kenneth L. Harris, Should There Be 
a “Form Consistency” Requirement? Danielson Revisited, 78 TAXES 88, 89 (2000) 
(referring to the “fundamental notion” that where the taxpayer controls the facts, 
the taxpayer is restricted in its “ability to assert the substance and not the form 
controls for tax purposes” as the “Taxpayer Non-Disavowal Principle”). Another 
example would be the way in which attaining a favorable non-tax regulatory 
outcome can serve the role of demonstrating “business purpose” under the 
economic substance doctrine. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic 
Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389, 433 (2010) [hereinafter Lederman, Economic 
Substance] (“[N]on-tax regulatory requirements seem to provide a business 
purpose, even if the regulator condones a way to evade those requirements.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A Proposal for 
Resolving the Substance-Form Debate, 48 TAX LAW. 289, 289 (1995) (“A 
fundamental principle of income tax law is that taxation should be based upon 
the substance, not the form, of a transaction.”); J. Bruce Donaldson, When 
Substance Over Form Argument Is Available to the Taxpayer, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 
41, 41 (1964) (“The gospel that the substance of a transaction, rather than mere 
form, controls the tax incidents is accepted by all.”); Harris, supra note 52, at 89 
(“It is a fundamental principle of federal income taxation that the tax 
consequences of a transaction turn on the ‘substance’ and not the ‘form’ of the 
transaction.”); Smith, supra note 52, at 137 (“A fundamental principle of . . . tax 
law is that taxation should be based upon the substance, and not the form, of 
transactions.”). A complete discussion of substance-over-form in tax law is beyond 
the scope of this Article. For some further discussion on this topic, see Joseph 
Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 
863–80 (1982); Jeffrey L. Kwall & Kristina Maynard, Dethroning King 
Enterprises, 58 TAX LAW. 1, 11–15 (2004); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance 
and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 386–87, 435–39 (1988); Lewis R. 
Steinberg, Form, Substance, and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52 TAX LAW. 457, 
457–88 (1999). 
 54. See, e.g., Baillif, supra note 53, at 289 (“Although the Service is routinely 
granted the right to look beyond the form of a transaction or its label on a tax 
return, a taxpayer’s right to assert the same privilege is, at best, uncertain.”); 
William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street: The Taxpayer’s Ability to Disavow 
Form, 70 OR. L. REV. 381, 384 (1991) (“The principle that the government alone 
may appeal to the substance of a transaction pervades federal tax law. Every 
taxpayer seeking to disavow the form of a transaction must consider the 
possibility that substance arguments create a one-way street in favor of the 
government.”); Donaldson, supra note 53, at 42 
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invoke the substance-over-form doctrine has been referred to as 
the “Non-Disavowal Doctrine.”55 Notwithstanding the 
Non-Disavowal Doctrine, taxpayers do not always lose when they 
assert the rule of substance-over-form.56 Oftentimes, prevailing 
taxpayers in such cases are able to provide a non-tax explanation 
for the form they selected.57 Thus, for these taxpayers, a favorable 
non-tax outcome increases the chances of a good tax outcome.58 
                                                                                                     
A considerable body of thought exists that the doctrine of substance is 
a sword available to the Commissioner, but that it may not be used as 
a shield by the taxpayer. . . . While this homely bit of wisdom has much 
present currency, it is not wholly accurate as a matter of over-all case 
analysis. 
Harris, supra note 52, at 89 (“[T]here is also a fundamental notion that where 
the taxpayer, and not the government controls the facts, the taxpayer should be 
restricted in its ability to assert that the substance and not the form controls for 
tax purposes . . . .”); Nickolas J. Kyser, Substance, Form, and Strong Proof, 11 
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 125, 125–26 (1994) 
The notion that tax consequences should flow from the substance 
rather than the form of transactions has been accepted by most 
courts . . . . As one might expect, the courts have been rather skeptical 
about the use of this idea by taxpayers, who were in position to control 
the original form of the transaction and whose protestations that 
something else was intended are likely to be affected by the 
selectiveness of self-interested memory. 
Smith, supra note 52, at 137 
The Commissioner clearly is entitled to invoke [the notion that 
substance prevails over form], but a taxpayer’s right to do so is 
problematic. At times, the courts have accepted a taxpayer’s assertion 
of the priority of substance. At other times, however, they have 
concluded that a taxpayer is bound by the form of his transaction. 
 55. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 52, at 89 (referring to this concept as the 
“Taxpayer Non-Disavowal Principle”); Smith, supra note 52, at 138 (referring to 
this concept as the “Non-Disavowal Principle”). 
 56. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also Emily Cauble, 
Reforming the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, 35 VA. TAX REV. 439, 441–42 (2016) 
(explaining that taxpayers have more success when providing a “non-tax 
explanation” for the selected form). 
 57. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also Cauble, supra note 
56, at 441–42 (explaining that taxpayers have more success when providing a 
“non-tax explanation” for the selected form); Comm’r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 
794 (9th Cir. 1936) (providing non-tax reason for selected form and succeeding on 
claim). 
 58. See Comm’r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1936) (providing 
non-tax reason for selected form and succeeding on claim). 
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In order to illustrate the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, consider the 
facts and holding of Maletis v. United States.59 In Maletis, the 
taxpayer established an entity to operate a wine-making 
business.60 In form, the entity was owned by the taxpayer and his 
two sons because paperwork had been filed with the IRS and state 
authorities indicating that the entity was owned by the three 
individuals and that all three had made contributions to the 
entity.61 In substance, the entity was owned only by the taxpayer.62 
His sons had not, in fact, made the claimed contributions to the 
entity and, apparently, had no real involvement in the business.63 
In years when the business was profitable, the taxpayer filed 
tax returns in accordance with the form of the arrangement (in 
other words, the tax returns were consistent with the entity being 
a partnership owned by three individuals).64 As a result, in years 
in which the business generated taxable income, that income was 
reported in part by the taxpayer and in part by his sons.65 This 
reporting led to less total tax liability than if all taxable income 
had been reported by the taxpayer presumably because the sons 
were subject to lower effective tax rates than the taxpayer.66  
In a subsequent year in which the business generated a loss, 
the taxpayer claimed that in substance the business was owned 
entirely by him and not by a partnership in which his sons were 
partners.67 As a result, the taxpayer asserted the right to deduct 
the entire tax loss, leading to lower overall tax liability than what 
would have resulted had the tax loss been shared among the 
taxpayer and his sons, given his sons’ lower effective tax rates.68 
The IRS challenged this treatment asserting that the taxpayer 
should be bound by the form he previously selected: that of a 
                                                                                                     
 59. Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952).  
 60. Id. at 97–98. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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partnership.69 The court held in favor of the IRS.70 Thus, the 
taxpayer was prevented from disavowing the form he selected and 
was required to report tax consequences based on form rather than 
substance.71 
Describing the rationale for the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, the 
court stated that without such a rule, “the taxpayer could 
commence doing business as a corporation or partnership, and, if 
everything [went] well, realize the income tax advantages 
therefrom; but if things [did] not turn out so well, [could] turn 
around and disclaim the business form he created to realize the 
loss as his individual loss.”72 In other words, one goal of the 
Non-Disavowal Doctrine is to prevent “post-transactional tax 
planning.”73  
A taxpayer who engages in “post-transactional tax planning” 
structures a transaction so that he or she may report based either 
on form or on substance, whichever would lead to more favorable 
tax consequences, once the results of the transaction are known.74 
In Maletis, for instance, if the business generated gains, the 
taxpayer would report the results based on form because doing so 
resulted in lower aggregate tax liability, but if the business 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. For further discussion, see Bailiff, supra note 53, at 298 (“[S]ome courts 
fear that permitting a taxpayer to disavow her own form might invite that 
taxpayer to engage in post-transactional tax planning. They worry that a 
taxpayer may decide alternatively to support or impeach a form based upon her 
post-transactional determination of the resultant tax liability . . . .”); Cauble, 
supra note 56, at 460–71 (“[T]he Non Disavowal Doctrine appears to be intended 
to address the possibility that taxpayers could intentionally engage in 
transactions whose form differed from their substance to leave themselves the 
option of engaging in Post-Transactional Tax Planning once the results of the 
transaction were known.”); Harris, supra note 52, at 97 (“[C]oncerns about post 
transactional tax planning . . . arise in situations where the taxpayer challenging 
the form . . . proceeds to assert substance-over-form only after tax audit.”); Smith, 
supra note 52, at 144 (“Some cases reflect the concern that permitting a taxpayer 
to disavow its own form might entitle a taxpayer to engage in post-transactional 
tax planning and, depending upon his tax circumstance, support or impeach 
form.”).  
 74. See Cauble, supra note 56, at 442–43 (discussing post-transactional tax 
planning). 
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generated losses, the taxpayer would report the results based on 
substance in order to obtain lower aggregate tax liability.75 
In some cases, taxpayers successfully report based on 
substance rather than form, notwithstanding the Non-Disavowal 
Doctrine.76 Oftentimes, in a case in which the taxpayer prevails, 
the taxpayer can provide a non-tax explanation for why the 
taxpayer adopted a form that was different from the transaction’s 
substance.77 In one example, the taxpayer labeled an instrument 
“equity,” even though its substantive features were debt-like, in 
order to avoid violating state usury laws.78 In another, the 
taxpayer labeled an instrument “equity,” even though it had 
debt-like substantive features, to avoid an adverse effect on the 
credit rating of the corporation that issued the instrument.79 In 
                                                                                                     
 75. See Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 98–99 (9th Cir. 1952) 
(discussing how the taxpayer obtained a tax benefit in the early years by treating 
the entity as a partnership and, in the later years, the taxpayer sought to treat 
the venture as if it were not a partnership). 
 76. See, e.g., Cauble, supra note 56, at 450–52 (discussing cases in which 
taxpayers have successfully asserted substance-over-form, notwithstanding the 
Non-Disavowal Doctrine). 
 77. In some cases, taxpayers’ attempts to assert that substance should 
prevail over form succeed even though the taxpayer cannot provide a non-tax 
explanation for the form selected. For an overview of the case law, see, for 
example, Blatt, supra note 54, at 427–38. 
 78. See Jones Syndicate v. Comm’r, 23 F.2d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 1927) (“[T]he 
witnesses who testified . . . described the transaction as a loan and stated that 
the parties made use of the so-called first preferred stock as a mere expedient to 
circumvent the force and effect of the usury laws.”). 
 79. See Comm’r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 792 (9th Cir. 1936) 
Aaron Holtz was willing to lend the necessary funds to the 
contemplated organization, but was not willing to accept stock because 
he desired to be assured that his advance would be repaid, and he also 
wanted a definite income from the funds. It was deemed inadvisable to 
issue bonds to cover the loans, as that would affect the credit of the 
corporation. 
For other cases in which taxpayers win and can provide a non-tax explanation for 
the form that they selected, see, e.g., United States v. Title Guarantee & Tr. Co., 
133 F.2d 990, 992–96 (6th Cir. 1943) (holding that payments made on “preferred 
stock” could be treated as deductible interest when the company issued “preferred 
stock” with some debt-like features rather than an instrument labeled “debt” with 
even more debt-like features in order to avoid an adverse effect on the company’s 
creditworthiness); E.C. Gatlin v. Comm’r, 34 B.T.A. 50, 56 (1936) (“We therefore 
conclude that a taxpayer who borrows money at a usurious rate of interest and 
[who], to conceal the usury, is compelled to execute a document which does not 
correctly describe the relationship of the parties, may, as against the government, 
EXPLOITING REGULATORY INCONSISTENCIES 1911 
both of these cases, the taxpayers prevailed in reporting the 
consequences of the transaction as if the instrument were debt for 
tax purposes.80 
At first glance, it may seem odd that courts are more likely to 
allow a taxpayer to obtain more beneficial tax consequences by 
disavowing the form he or she selected if the form produced 
non-tax benefits. However, this feature of law could be explained 
as an attempt by courts to identify taxpayers who are not engaged 
in “post-transactional tax planning” and allow those taxpayers to 
disavow their selected forms.81 If a taxpayer engages in a 
transaction and selects a form that differs from the transaction’s 
substance, the taxpayer’s choice of form might generally suggest 
that the taxpayer planned to leave open the option of engaging in 
“post-transactional tax planning” by reporting the tax 
consequences of the transaction based on either its form or its 
substance, whichever, in hindsight, led to more favorable tax 
consequences.82 If a given form was selected instead to produce 
                                                                                                     
disclose the true relationship of debtor and creditor.”); Comm’r v. Bollinger, 485 
U.S. 340, 342–50 (1988) (holding that a taxpayer could show that the true owner 
of property, for tax purposes, was not a corporation when the reason the 
corporation held legal title to the property was to avoid conflict with states usury 
laws); Jones v. United States, 659 F.2d 618, 619–22 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
instruments could be treated as debt for tax purposes despite the fact that they 
had some equity-like features when the reason for the equity-like features was to 
comply with state statutory requirements governing insurance companies); Rev. 
Rul. 78-397, 1978-2 C.B. 150 (concluding that a taxpayer could disregard a 
circular flow of cash to treat the transaction based, instead, on its substance in a 
circumstance in which the circular flow of cash was undertaken to meet minimum 
state capitalization requirements). 
 80. See Jones Syndicate, 23 F.2d at 835 (“[A] taxpayer who borrows money 
at a usurious rate of interest, and who, to conceal the usury, is compelled to 
execute a document which does not correctly describe the relationship of the 
parties, may, as against the government, disclose the true relationship of debtor 
and creditor.”); Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d at 735 (upholding the lower court’s decision 
to treat the instrument as debt for tax purposes). 
 81. This feature of current law might also be explained by some of the other 
potential rationales for the Non-Disavowal Doctrine. For further discussion, see 
Cauble, supra note 56, at 473 n.113 (discussing how this feature of law might also 
be explained by other justifications for the Non-Disavowal Doctrine, including the 
fact that the presence of a non-tax reason for adopting a given form can 
undermine the extent to which the form of the transaction is reliable evidence of 
a party’s intent). 
 82. See Cauble, supra note 56, at 443 (mentioning that, in the absence of 
another explanation, the fact that a taxpayer designed a transaction so that its 
form differed from its substance might suggest that a taxpayer planned to engage 
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some non-tax benefits (for instance, if an instrument was labeled 
“equity” to avoid state usury laws) that provides an alternative 
explanation for the taxpayer’s chosen form, and the alternative 
explanation might help to rebut the presumption that the taxpayer 
selected a transactional form in order to facilitate 
“post-transactional tax planning.”83 
This line of reasoning is not entirely illogical. However, this 
method of analysis will fail in many cases to accurately distinguish 
between taxpayers who are engaging in “post-transactional tax 
planning” and taxpayers who are not. As a result, some taxpayers 
who are engaging in “post-transactional tax planning,” or who did 
structure their transactions to facilitate “post-transactional tax 
planning,” will, successfully disavow their selected forms.84 This is 
true because a taxpayer could have multiple motives for selecting 
a given form. For example, a taxpayer could label an instrument 
that has debt-like features “equity” not only in order to avoid state 
usury laws, but also to enable “post-transactional tax planning.”85 
                                                                                                     
in post-transactional tax planning). 
 83. Id. 
 84. This approach can also result in holding some taxpayers to their selected 
forms even when they did not engage in and had no intention to engage in 
post-transactional tax planning. For further discussion, see Cauble, supra note 
56, at 474–75 
Some taxpayers may select a given form that differed from a 
transaction’s substance merely because they did not give adequate 
thought to the resulting tax consequences and did not seek tax advice 
at the time they selected the form. For instance, a taxpayer might hold 
an instrument that has debt-like features but label the instrument 
“equity” in various documents merely because the taxpayer did not 
evaluate the tax consequences of doing so. It is possible that this 
taxpayer had no plans to engage in Post-Transactional Tax Planning 
and would have reported the tax consequences as if the instrument was 
debt (because it is debt in substance) regardless of the transaction's 
economic outcome . . . . Nevertheless, if this taxpayer characterizes the 
instrument as debt for tax reporting purposes in a year in which equity 
treatment would lead to more tax liability, the Service can challenge 
the taxpayer’s reporting based on the Non-Disavowal Doctrine. 
Assuming the taxpayer has no non-tax explanation to offer for the 
“equity” label that the taxpayer used, the taxpayer would likely lose. 
 85. For further discussion and a proposal for reform, see Cauble, supra note 
56, at 475–81 (explaining how a taxpayer could be engaging in post-transactional 
tax planning despite the fact that the taxpayer can offer a non-tax explanation 
for his or her selected form and proposing a new method of analysis for courts to 
use). 
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As another illustration of how a non-tax explanation could 
facilitate tax planning, imagine the facts of Maletis, but with a 
couple modifications. Assume that the taxpayer adopted the 
partnership form in order to obtain some non-tax benefit (perhaps 
it allowed borrowing at a rate that would have violated state usury 
laws if the loan were made to an individual rather than a 
partnership). Also assume that the venture proved to be 
unsuccessful for many years so that, in all years to date, the 
taxpayer has reported the losses as his own (based on the 
substance of the arrangement). Because this taxpayer can offer a 
non-tax explanation for the form selected, the Non-Disavowal 
Doctrine will not prevent this taxpayer from reporting the 
consequences as if the arrangement were owned solely by the 
taxpayer (disavowing the partnership form selected).86 This is true 
notwithstanding the fact that this taxpayer may have intended to 
engage in “post-transactional tax planning” (if the venture had 
been successful and generated taxable income, the taxpayer may 
have reported the results as if the venture were owned by a 
partnership).87 For taxpayers such as this, non-tax regulatory 
regimes do not act as a friction against tax planning.88 On the 
contrary, the ability to offer a non-tax explanation for a taxpayer’s 
selected form greases the tax planning wheels. 
                                                                                                     
 86. One might argue that, in such a case, there is no reason not to allow the 
taxpayer to disavow the selected form. Unlike in the actual Maletis case, the 
taxpayer never reported the results based on form. Therefore, the taxpayer is not 
attempting to whipsaw the IRS by reporting based on substance after having 
already reported based on form in years that are closed by the statute of 
limitations. However, invoking the Non-Disavowal Doctrine might still be 
warranted in this case if the taxpayer planned to report based on form in years 
when the business was profitable, but the taxpayer simply has not had a chance 
to do so because the venture has not generated taxable income. Invoking the 
Non-Disavowal Doctrine in such a case could be described as a penalty intended 
to discourage taxpayers from structuring transactions so that form differed from 
substance to enable post-transactional tax planning. 
 87. If the taxpayer did report the results as if the venture was owned by a 
partnership, the IRS could successfully challenge this claim based on the 
substance-over-form doctrine. See supra note 53 and accompanying text 
(discussing the substance-over-form doctrine). However, the IRS might not audit 
this particular taxpayer, and in such a case, the taxpayer’s claim would proceed 
unchallenged. 
 88. See infra Part V.A (discussing the existing literature regarding frictions 
against tax planning). 
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III. Inconsistency is not Necessarily Inconsistency 
Tax planning—taxpayers re-arranging their transactions and 
other behavior to obtain more favorable tax outcomes—potentially 
leads to a number of adverse consequences, at least when it is not 
the type of planning that tax provisions are explicitly designed to 
encourage.89 In particular, when sophisticated parties structure 
their transactions to obtain more beneficial tax outcomes, that 
behavior erodes tax revenue.90 In addition, tax planning 
perpetuates unfairness when sophisticated parties achieve more 
favorable tax outcomes than less sophisticated taxpayers.91 It also 
contributes to the perception that the tax system is unfair, which 
can, in turn, undermine voluntary tax compliance.92 Finally, tax 
                                                                                                     
 89. If the planning is what Congress intended, then it is not abusive and 
possibly is valuable, if the behavior encouraged by the particular tax provision is 
valuable. See, e.g., Lederman, Economic Substance, supra note 52, at 395–96 
If measuring income without altering taxpayer behavior were the only 
thing Congress sought to accomplish with the federal income tax 
system, then, in theory, any tax-motivated action could be considered 
inconsistent with the goal of the tax system . . . . However, it is well 
known that the federal income tax system does not try only to measure 
taxpayers’ taxable income. It also contains provisions expressly 
designed to alter taxpayers’ behavior. These latter provisions 
intentionally mismeasure income in order to induce more of a 
particular activity. For example, the individual retirement account 
provisions encourage people to save money for their retirement. More 
generally, certain transactions may only be profitable after taxes and 
may thus be undertaken because of the tax subsidy the government 
offers. Taking the government up on proffered tax benefits is, by 
definition, not abusive. 
 90. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1319 (“The reasons for curtailing tax 
planning are familiar and can be stated briefly. Obviously, more revenue is 
collected, so the government is funded without need for other taxes that are less 
appealing.”). 
 91. See, e.g., id. (“The reasons for curtailing tax planning are familiar and 
can be stated briefly . . . . Since wealthy and well advised taxpayers have an edge 
in planning, limiting this advantage can lead to a more equitable distribution of 
tax burdens.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Tax Planning, Effective Marginal Tax Rates, 
and the Structure of the Income Tax, 54 TAX L. REV. 555, 555 (2001) (“The specter 
of wealthy individuals and large corporations hiring legions of high-priced 
lawyers and accountants to develop and implement tax saving strategies creates 
the perception that the system is unfair.”); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay 
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1476–
78 (2003) (discussing the effects of perceptions of fairness on tax compliance); 
Schizer, supra note 39, at 1319 (“Since wealthy and well advised taxpayers have 
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planning potentially creates inefficiency and wastes societal 
resources.93 
These ramifications of tax planning exist even in cases that do 
not involve exploiting regulatory inconsistencies. To address the 
question of whether something should be done to prevent 
exploiting regulatory inconsistencies, we should address the 
question of whether inconsistency, in and of itself, is particularly 
problematic. 
If the two regulatory regimes serve different purposes, the 
perceived inconsistency is not troubling because it is not true 
inconsistency. The parties are not, for instance, representing 
different facts to different regulators. The regulators view the 
same facts through their respective lenses and reach different 
conclusions because they are focused on classifications with 
different criteria.94 For example, something could be “debt” for tax 
                                                                                                     
an edge in planning, limiting this advantage can lead to a more equitable 
distribution of tax burdens. The average taxpayer’s faith in the system is 
preserved, promoting voluntary compliance and the attendant savings in 
enforcement costs.”). 
 93. See Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of 
Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 23 (2010) 
(“Scholars generally conclude that the ability of taxpayers to select their tax 
treatment by arranging their business affairs in particular ways is detrimental 
to societal welfare . . . .”); Knoll, supra note 92, at 555 (“Tax planning not only 
creates harmful perceptions, it also is frequently harmful in its own 
right . . . . [T]ax planning leads taxpayers to invest in many projects that they 
would not undertake solely on the economics.”); Schizer, supra note 39, at 1319 
(stating that limiting tax planning reduces “social waste . . . as taxpayers refrain 
from tax motivated behavior”); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and 
Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1999) [hereinafter 
Weisbach, Line Drawing] (“Taxing similar activities differently causes behavioral 
distortions . . . .”). Additionally, scholars have observed that tax planning is 
wasteful because the time and resources devoted to tax planning could be put to 
better, more productive uses. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 92, at 555–56 (“From a 
societal standpoint, it would be better simply to reduce taxes and redeploy the 
time and talent devoted to tax planning to other more productive pursuits.”); 
David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002) 
[hereinafter Weisbach, Ten Truths] (“Nothing is gained by finding new ways to 
turn ordinary income into capital gain, to push a gain offshore, or to generate 
losses. No new medicines are found, computer chips designed, or homeless housed 
through tax planning.”). 
 94. For similar discussion, see Barry, supra note 8, at 75 (“The difference in 
treatment between regimes is an indicator that one of the regulatory regimes may 
be treating them inappropriately, but the difference in treatment is not a problem 
in and of itself.”); Fleischer, supra note 1, at 244 
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purposes, but “equity” for state usury law purposes if the state 
usury laws have good reason to mean something different by “debt” 
than what is meant in the tax context.95 If the regimes serve 
different goals, then to avoid a true inconsistency (meaning 
inconsistency between how the transaction is treated under one of 
the regimes and how it should be treated under that regime), it 
might be necessary to classify a transaction differently for 
purposes of each regime. 
One might respond that inconsistent treatment compounds 
the problems associated with run-of-the-mill tax planning (in other 
words, tax planning that does not involve inconsistent treatment) 
by making tax planning easier. In particular, by claiming 
inconsistent treatment, a sophisticated party can obtain a 
favorable tax outcome without sacrificing his or her non-tax 
regulatory goals. In other words, claiming inconsistent treatment 
nullifies a potential friction, a concern that is addressed in Part V 
below. 
One might also respond that inconsistent treatment 
compounds the typical tax planning problems by further 
perpetuating unfairness because the inconsistent treatment 
heightens the advantages gained by sophisticated parties. Not only 
can sophisticated parties obtain better tax outcomes than others, 
but they can also obtain more favorable non-tax regulatory 
outcomes at the same time. However, if the non-tax regulatory 
regime has goals that are entirely unrelated to the goals of tax law, 
this concern may be misplaced. A party who obtains a favorable 
tax outcome via planning may have benefited from a number of 
fortunate circumstances in any number of areas of life, and 
                                                                                                     
Doctrinal inconsistency is not always a mistake caused by inept 
legislative drafting. Different regulators may have different policy 
goals in mind. It may be important for securities regulators, who seek 
to protect investors, to define the meaning of “security,” “dealer,” or 
“sale” in a way that differs from the taxing authorities, who seek to 
raise money for the public fisc. 
Grace Soyon Lee, What’s In a Name?: The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of 
Credit Card Securitizations, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 110, 162–65 (2010) (discussing 
how, in the context of credit card securitization, tax treatment and accounting 
treatment may differ because accounting rules have different goals than tax 
rules). 
 95. See supra Part II.B (discussing potential causes of inconsistencies 
between an instrument’s tax classification and its classification for purposes of 
state usury laws). 
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obtaining a favorable non-tax regulatory outcome is not, in 
principle, any different from those other fortunate circumstances. 
In other words, to argue that someone is less deserving of a 
favorable tax outcome because he or she obtained a favorable state 
usury law outcome would seem to be equivalent to arguing that a 
person is less deserving of a favorable tax outcome because he or 
she benefits from good health. 
IV. Inconsistency as a Byproduct of Inaccuracy 
Although inconsistent treatment across regulatory regimes, in 
and of itself, might not be a problem, in some cases, the 
inconsistency could result from incorrect classification under one 
or more of the regimes. Because this Part makes use of examples 
involving the classification of instruments as debt or equity, it will 
begin by describing how tax law classifies instruments. Then, it 
will discuss whether and when inconsistency between tax 
classification and state usury law classification is acceptable. 
Finally, it will evaluate the appropriateness of inconsistency 
between tax characterization and categorization for purposes of 
capital requirements. 
A. Debt Versus Equity in Tax Law 
Based on existing doctrine, an instrument will be treated as 
debt for tax purposes only if the parties intend for the holder of the 
instrument to have a definite right to be repaid a fixed amount at 
a certain time, regardless of the income of the obligor.96 To 
                                                                                                     
 96. See, e.g., Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1984) 
The determination of whether an advance is debt or equity depends on 
the distinction between a creditor who seeks a definite obligation that 
is payable in any event, and a shareholder who seeks to make an 
investment and to share in the profits and risks of loss in the venture. 
Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1967) 
The term “indebtedness” implies an existing unconditional and legally 
enforceable obligation to pay . . . . Generally, these criteria are 
designed to disclose the real nature of the transaction in question-that 
is whether it exhibits the characteristics of a bona-fide loan to the 
corporation which is expected, indeed, may be compelled, to be repaid 
in full at some future date, or whether as a formalized attempt to 
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determine the parties’ intent, courts examine underlying 
substantive factors rather than merely relying on the parties’ label 
for the instrument.97 Assume, for instance, that the holder of a 
given instrument has provided an advance to a corporation. 
Substantive factors in the case of the advance to the corporation 
could include, among others: (1) whether the corporation has made 
an unconditional promise to pay a fixed amount to the holder of 
the instrument, (2) whether the holder of the instrument has a 
legal right to enforce payment, (3) whether the instrument has a 
long or short term to maturity, (4) whether the corporation is 
thinly capitalized (in other words, whether it has a high ratio of 
debt to equity), (5) the liquidity of the corporation’s assets, (6) the 
stability of the corporation’s revenues, (7) subordination of the 
instrument to other creditors, and (8) whether the instrument that 
is claimed to be “debt” is held by the owners of the equity of the 
corporation and, if so, whether the “debt” is held in the same 
proportion as the proportion in which the owners hold the equity.98 
These factors can be grouped into three general categories. 
First, a court might use some of the factors to verify, as a threshold 
matter, that the holder of the instrument has a legal right to 
receive definite payment.99 Factors (1) and (2) assist a court in 
making this determination, which is relevant to the ultimate 
question the court must answer: whether the parties intend for the 
                                                                                                     
achieve the desired tax result while lacking in necessary substance, it 
merely parades under the false colors of such a transaction. 
John Lizak, Inc. v. Comm’r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 804, 807 (1969) (“It has often been 
recognized that ‘the essential difference between a creditor and a stockholder is 
that the latter intends to make an investment and take the risks of the venture, 
while the former seeks a definite obligation, payable in any event.”); see also 
William T. Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A 
Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 404–05 (1970–71) (quoting 
and citing to cases that have described the distinction between debt and equity in 
a similar manner). 
 97. See Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1367–68 (“The outward form of the transaction is 
not controlling; rather, characterization depends on the taxpayer’s actual intent, 
as evidenced by the circumstances and conditions of the advance.”). 
 98. See Plumb, supra note 96, at 411–12 (compiling and categorizing a list of 
factors upon which courts have relied). 
 99. See Plumb, supra note 96, at 411–12 (conceptualizing this category as 
factors “involving the formal rights and remedies of creditors as distinguished 
from stockholders”). 
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holder of the instrument to have a definite right to be repaid a fixed 
amount at a certain time, regardless of the income of the obligor. 
Second, some of the factors are aimed at determining whether 
or not the advance could be repaid.100 In other words, some are 
utilized to assess the instrument’s risk.101 Factors (3) through (7) 
provide information relevant to assessing risk, or the corporation’s 
ability to make payments when due. Although courts do not always 
view the world in this way,102 if the relevant factors suggest that 
an instrument is very risky, such an assessment could undercut a 
determination that the holder possessed a legal right to payment. 
This would cause the instrument to be treated as equity for tax 
purposes. However, a determination that an instrument is not very 
risky should not negate the fact that the issuer has no legal 
obligation to make a payment on the instrument under the 
instrument’s formal legal terms. In other words, the riskiness of 
an instrument could make promises to pay illusory with the result 
that a court would not respect those promises in characterizing the 
instrument. However, we can consider the reverse by imagining 
that the parties have made abundantly clear that a low-risk issuer 
will be excused from making payments in the event of financial 
difficulty. The fact that the instrument is not risky (in the sense 
that financial difficulty is unlikely) arguably should not convince a 
court that the parties intend for the holder of the instrument to 
have a definite right to be repaid a fixed amount at a certain time, 
regardless of the income of the obligor.103 The parties have 
explicitly provided otherwise. 
                                                                                                     
 100. See id. (conceptualizing this category as factors “bearing on the 
reasonableness or economic reality of [the intention to create a debtor-creditor 
relationship] (the risk element)”). 
 101. See id. (describing these factors as relevant to the “risk element”). 
 102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing how some courts 
follow this approach but some do not). 
 103. A number of courts follow an approach similar to what is described 
above. See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 96, at 413 
The presence of a maturity date does not guarantee recognition of 
indebtedness, if other factors indicate an equity investment, since “it 
is not unusual for preferred stock to have a maturity or retirement 
date” and since there may be an unexpressed intention not to enforce 
the obligation when it comes due. But the absence of such an 
unconditional right to demand payment is most often conclusive. 
However, some courts have departed from this approach. See, e.g., Plumb, supra 
note 96, at 415 (“There are some cases, however, holding that contingency of 
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Finally, courts employ some factors to judge whether the 
advance would be repaid even if funds were available and even if 
the holder has a technical right to enforce payment.104 In 
particular, factor (8) above assists courts with this inquiry.105 To 
take an extreme example of a situation in which factor (8) applies, 
imagine that one individual owns 100% of the equity of a 
corporation, and that individual also makes a loan to the 
corporation. Even if the formal terms of the instrument provide the 
holder with a right to enforce a definite payment obligation, courts 
might be skeptical of the likelihood that the holder of the 
instrument would enforce that right, given that the holder would 
be enforcing the right against his or her wholly-owned 
corporation.106 That said, courts will not, inevitably, 
re-characterize the instrument as equity for tax purposes. The 
instrument could be respected as debt, as long as, based on other 
factors (such as the corporation not being too thinly capitalized), 
the instrument was not excessively risky.107 In such a case, the 
rationale for respecting it as debt may be that if an unrelated 
person were to make an arms-length loan on the same terms and 
if the loan from the unrelated person would have been respected 
as debt for tax purposes, then there is no reason why the same 
instrument should not also be considered debt when it is held by 
the corporation’s sole owner. 
                                                                                                     
ultimate payment upon availability of earnings is not conclusive against the 
existence of a debt, at least if there is a reasonable expectancy that full payment 
will occur.”). The IRS also has departed from this method of analysis in a chief 
counsel advisory. Infra notes 136–137 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Plumb, supra note 96, at 411–12 (conceptualizing this category as 
factors “bearing on the genuineness of the intention to create a debtor-creditor 
relationship”). 
 105. Other factors that courts use to address this question could include: 
(1) whether payments have been made on the instrument when due, (2) if 
payments were not made when due, whether the holder brought legal action to 
enforce payment, and (3) other, similar factors. Plumb, supra note 96, at 412. 
 106. See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 96, at 406 (“[T]he limitations on the rights of 
purported creditors that must be carefully spelled out in the instruments when 
outside investors are involved may exist as tacit understandings when the 
common shareholders or closely related parties themselves supply the funds.”). 
 107. See, e.g., id. at 470 (“Once it is acknowledged, however, that a 
shareholder may occupy a dual status as investor and creditor, proportionality 
per so cannot be viewed as affirmative evidence for treatment of purported debt 
as equity.”). 
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B. Tax and State Usury Law 
Consider the example of an instrument that is classified as 
debt for tax purposes, but equity for state usury law purposes. 
These different regulatory regimes could reach different results 
because one is predominantly substance-based, while the other is 
more form-driven. As discussed above, tax law classifies 
instruments as debt or equity based on substantive factors.108 On 
the other hand, state usury laws in a given jurisdiction might 
adopt a more formal classification system, relying more heavily 
upon the labels adopted by the parties.109 Assume a given state has 
adopted a form-based system mainly for reasons of administrative 
convenience (because form is more readily apparent), but for other 
policy reasons, the state would prefer a more substance-based 
definition.  If this is the case, then treating the instrument 
differently for purposes of usury law than how it is treated for tax 
purposes may be undesirable. Because the difficult work of 
classifying based on substance is already necessary for tax 
purposes, such a state might decide to reform its usury law 
definition to tie classification to the tax classification, if the state’s 
only rationale for using a form-based system is administrative 
ease. 
Of course, in many cases, the “substance” that is relevant for 
state usury law purposes would not be the same “substance” that 
is relevant for tax purposes. State usury laws are generally aimed 
at protecting the recipient of an advance of funds from 
advantage-taking by the person who makes the advance. 
Presumably, equity is exempted from state usury laws because a 
high return on equity takes advantage of no one, so long as the 
equity is subordinate to all other interests in the venture. In other 
words, if a debt-holder is paid before an equity-holder, a high 
                                                                                                     
 108. See supra notes 98–106 and accompanying text (discussing factors 
considered when determining whether an instrument is equity or debt for tax 
purposes). 
 109. It seems that this was true in the case of the usury laws applicable in 
Jones Syndicate. Supra note 78 and accompanying text. For a more modern 
example, consider Bollinger. Supra note 79 and accompanying text. For purposes 
of determining who the borrower was in Bollinger, the applicable state usury laws 
examined who held formal legal title to the property that secured the loan rather 
than relying upon more substantive indicia of ownership. Comm’r v. Bollinger, 
485 U.S. 340, 347–49 (1988). 
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interest rate on the debt detracts from the return earned by the 
equity-holder. A high return on equity harms no one given that the 
equity-holder’s claim is not preferred to the claims of others. Based 
on this line of thinking, if usury laws were based on substance, 
subordination of a claim would seem to be the pre-eminent factor 
in any analysis of whether a claim was debt or equity. If a claim 
was subordinated to all other claims, it would clearly be equity for 
state usury law purposes. If a claim was not subordinated to all 
other claims, it might not be equity for state usury law purposes.110 
Layered on top of this, one could imagine state usury laws not 
applying to a debt instrument if the borrower was deemed to be 
sophisticated (using any number of plausible proxies for 
sophistication), and therefore, less likely to fall victim to an 
unscrupulous lender.111 
In the tax context, subordination of a claim to other creditors 
is one factor that increases the likelihood that the claim will be 
classified as equity for tax purposes, given that subordination 
increases the risk that the holder will not receive payment.112 
Therefore, there is some overlap between the factors that are 
relevant to the tax analysis and the factors that could be relevant 
to a substance-based state usury law analysis. 
However, some of the factors that weigh in favor of equity for 
tax purposes have no bearing on the primary concern behind state 
usury law—namely, the possibility that the holder of the 
                                                                                                     
 110. Perhaps, even if an instrument was not subordinated to all other claims, 
state usury laws might classify it as equity if it was sufficiently risky to justify a 
higher rate of return. That could be the case. However, many of the circumstances 
in which a lender might charge a high rate of interest are circumstances in which 
the rate might be risk-based (based on the borrower’s lack of credit history or bad 
credit history, for instance), and yet, these are the typical circumstances in which 
state usury laws would apply. In any case, the analysis above is designed as 
merely an illustration of the process that regulators might follow when analyzing 
whether inconsistent treatment is or is not appropriate. In particular, regulators 
should consider the goals of each regime, and based on those goals, determine 
which substantive factors are relevant to classify a given instrument or 
transaction. 
 111. In Commissioner v. Bollinger, for instance, the state usury laws would 
not apply to a loan made to a corporation, but would have applied to a loan made 
to the corporation’s sole owner, perhaps based on the dubious (and form-driven) 
assumption that corporations are sophisticated. 485 U.S. 340, 347–49 (1988). 
 112. See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 96, at 421–30 (discussing the use of 
subordination to other creditors as a factor in the tax analysis). 
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instrument could take advantage of the owners of business by 
requiring a high return. For instance, imagine a corporation 
acquires assets worth $1,000. The corporation, in turn, has issued 
three instruments to raise the capital used to acquire its assets: 
(1) one instrument (Clear Debt) that is clearly debt for all purposes 
(tax and usury law), (2) a second instrument (Ambiguous) whose 
classification is ambiguous, and (3) a third instrument (Clear 
Equity) that is clearly equity for all purposes (tax and usury law). 
The holders of Ambiguous have claims to income of the corporation 
and assets on liquidation that are subordinated to the claims of 
Clear Debt, but prior to the claims of Clear Equity. Because the 
claims of Ambiguous are prior to the claims of Clear Equity, the 
possibility of advantage-taking cannot be entirely ruled out, so 
debt would be an arguably appropriate classification for state 
usury law purposes. 
The instrument’s tax classification would depend on a number 
of other factors in addition to subordination. For instance, with a 
thinly capitalized corporation (meaning the ratio of its debt to its 
equity is high), the riskiness of Ambiguous increases substantially, 
and therefore, so too do the odds of Ambiguous being treated as 
equity for tax purposes.113 Compare, for instance, Example 1 (Clear 
Debt is $700, Ambiguous is $100, and Clear Equity is $200) to 
Example 2 (Clear Debt is $200, Ambiguous is $100, and Clear 
Equity is $700). Ambiguous is a much riskier instrument in 
Example 1 than in Example 2. In Example 1, if the value of the 
corporation’s assets were to decrease by more than $200 (which 
represents 20% of the total asset value), Ambiguous would not be 
repaid in full. In Example 2, however, the value of the corporation’s 
assets could decrease by $700 (which represents 70% of the total 
asset value) before Ambiguous received less than full repayment. 
Because Ambiguous is much riskier in Example 1, it is much more 
likely that Ambiguous would be classified as equity for tax 
purposes in Example 1. At the same time, increasing the 
proportion of assets funded by Clear Debt does not necessarily 
lessen the concern that the holders of Ambiguous could take 
advantage of the holders of Clear Equity by exacting a high rate of 
return. As long as someone is in line behind Ambiguous, potential 
                                                                                                     
 113. See, e.g., id. at 507–19 (discussing the use of thin capitalization as a 
factor in the tax analysis). 
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for advantage-taking exists. Accordingly, thin capitalization does 
not necessarily suggest that an instrument should be treated like 
equity for state usury law purposes. The increased risk should, 
arguably, increase the maximum allowable interest rate, but it 
would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that usury laws ought 
not apply at all. 
As mentioned above, some of the factors used in the tax 
analysis of debt versus equity do not relate the risk of the 
instrument (whether the instrument can be repaid), but instead 
inform the question of whether the advance will be repaid.114 For 
instance, if an instrument that is purportedly “debt” is held by the 
owners of the equity of a business and held in the same proportion 
as the proportion in which they hold the equity, the chances that 
the instrument will be reclassified as equity for tax purposes 
increase.115 To illustrate, assume that, in Example 1 and Example 
2 above, two entities each own 50% of the Clear Equity. The 
likelihood of Ambiguous being classified as equity in either 
example increases if those same two entities also own 50% of 
Ambiguous. If they each own 50% of each instrument, then the 
entities will be indifferent between the corporation making a given 
payment to the holders of Ambiguous or to the holders of Clear 
Equity, because, in either case, they each receive 50% of the 
payment. Consequently, if the corporation were to encounter some 
temporary financial trouble such that forgiving payments due on 
Ambiguous might increase the corporation’s overall value, the 
holders of Ambiguous would be very unlikely to enforce payment 
obligations. Each holder is compensated for any amount that 
either loses equally on Ambiguous by an equally  increased return 
on Clear Equity. 
This same factor (the instrument being held in the same 
proportion as equity) should also obviate the need to worry about 
advantage-taking by the holders of Ambiguous. A high rate of 
return on Ambiguous detracts only from the return on Clear 
Equity. If both instruments were held by the same entities and 
                                                                                                     
 114. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (describing factors 
relevant to the evaluation of whether an advance will be repaid). 
 115. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
chances that an instrument will be classified as equity for tax purposes increase 
if the instrument is held by the equity-holders in the same proportion as the 
proportion in which they hold the equity). 
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were held in the same proportion, then any harm done to either 
entity as a result of holding Clear Equity would inure to the benefit 
of that same entity as a result of holding Ambiguous. Therefore, 
proportionate ownership would also be a factor that would weigh 
in favor of treating Ambiguous as equity for state usury law 
purposes if state usury laws were to employ a substance-based 
analysis. 
Even though proportionate ownership is a factor that weighs 
in favor of classifying an instrument as equity for tax purposes, it 
does not, under current doctrine, end the tax analysis.116 Owners 
of something that is clearly equity could still make loans to a 
corporation that could be respected as debt for tax purposes, even 
if the loans were made in proportion to their equity ownership.117 
To take an extreme example, imagine that one entity owned 100% 
of the stock of a corporation. That entity could make a loan to the 
corporation that was respected as debt so long as the instrument 
was not excessively risky (based on other factors, such as the 
corporation not being too thinly capitalized).118 In such a case, 
however, the reasoning described above would still suggest that 
the instrument should be equity for purposes of state usury laws. 
An entity would not take advantage of its wholly-owned 
corporation by making a loan and charging an excessively high 
rate. 
Given that different “substance” matters to each regime, 
inconsistent treatment, in some cases, is appropriate. For example, 
assume an instrument is classified as equity for tax purposes, but 
debt for state usury law purposes. This inconsistency may be 
appropriate if the claims of some equity-holders are subordinated 
to the claims of the instrument-holder (so that it is classified as 
debt for state usury law purposes given the potential harm that 
could befall the holders of the subordinated claims), but the obligor 
on the instrument was thinly capitalized (so that it is classified as 
equity for tax purposes given the riskiness of the instrument). As 
another example, assume an instrument is classified as debt for 
                                                                                                     
 116. See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (noting that it is 
possible for an instrument to be classified as debt even when it is held by the 
equity-holders in the same proportion as the proportion in which they hold 
equity). 
 117. Supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text. 
 118. Supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text. 
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tax purposes, but equity for state usury law purposes. This 
inconsistency may be appropriate if the instrument is held in the 
same proportion as any claims that are subordinated to it (so that 
it is classified as equity for state usury law purposes given that 
there is no potential for a high rate of return on the instrument to 
harm the holders of subordinated claims) and, at the same time, 
various facts support classifying the instrument as debt for tax 
purposes (for instance, the terms of the instrument provide the 
holder with a definite and legally enforceable right to payment on 
a date that is not far in the future, and the entity is not thinly 
capitalized). 
In other cases, inconsistent treatment may be inappropriate. 
For example, if an instrument was treated as debt for tax purposes 
because its holders had claims to income of the entity and assets 
upon liquidation that were prior to the claims held by all others 
and the venture was not thinly capitalized, the instrument should 
likely be classified as debt for state usury law purposes as well 
(assuming no countervailing factor, such as the fact that the 
instrument is held in the same proportion as the subordinated 
claims). In such a case, inconsistent treatment would likely occur 
only if the applicable state usury law regime employed a 
classification scheme based on form rather than substance, which 
might not be justified by considerations of administrative ease if 
the work of substance-based determinations must already be 
undertaken for tax purposes. 
C. Tax and Capital Requirements 
Just as a taxpayer might design an instrument that is debt for 
tax purposes, but equity for purposes of state usury law, so too 
might a bank issue an instrument that was debt for tax purposes, 
but equity for purposes of capital requirements. Bank capital 
requirements are generally aimed at reducing the risk that a bank 
will become insolvent.119 In addition to other requirements, a bank 
                                                                                                     
 119. See, e.g., Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Regulation by Enforcement: An 
Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 649 (2012) (“Other things being equal, banks 
that hold more capital are less likely to become insolvent and inflict losses on 
depositors.”). 
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will be required to maintain a minimum “leverage ratio.”120 The 
“leverage ratio” is the ratio of the bank’s “tier one capital” to total 
assets.121 “Tier one capital” includes instruments issued by the 
bank that are categorized, for bank regulatory purposes, as various 
types of equity.122 
A higher “leverage ratio” reduces the risk of insolvency.123 If a 
bank’s assets fall in value, but still exceed the value of deposits and 
other liabilities, the bank remains solvent.124 Thus, a higher 
leverage ratio decreases the risk of insolvency because “tier one 
capital” bears the first losses.125 
For instance, assume a bank’s total assets were worth $100 
million. Assume the bank acquired those assets using $70 million 
held in deposit accounts at the bank and $30 million raised by 
issuing equity (“tier one capital”). If the assets declined in value, 
but not below $70 million, the bank would remain solvent and able 
to honor the claims of deposit-holders.126 The first $30 million in 
losses would be borne by the equity-holders. The risk that this 
bank would become insolvent is lower than the risk of insolvency 
for an otherwise identical bank with a lower ratio of equity to 
assets.127 For instance, if the otherwise identical bank were to 
acquire $100 million in assets using $90 million held in deposit 
accounts and $10 million raised by issuing equity, its risk of 
insolvency would be much greater. 
A bank might issue a preferred stock instrument with enough 
debt-like features so that it constitutes debt for tax purposes, but 
                                                                                                     
 120. See id. at 650–51 (discussing the leverage ratio requirement and other 
requirements). 
 121. See id. at 651 (defining “leverage ratio”). 
 122. See id. (defining “tier one capital” as “essentially common stock, 
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in the equity 
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries”). 
 123. See id. (providing an example of how a higher “leverage ratio” lowers the 
risk of insolvency). 
 124. See id. at 649 (stating that holding more capital reduces the chance of a 
bank becoming insolvent). 
 125. See id. at 651 (describing banks with a higher “leverage ratios” as 
generally subject to a lower risk of insolvency). 
 126. See id. at 649 (“[B]anks that hold more capital are less likely to become 
insolvent and inflict losses on depositors.”). 
 127. See supra note 123–125 and accompanying text (discussing the 
decreased risk that comes from a higher “leverage ratio”). 
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equity for purposes of capital requirements. This combination 
would provide the bank (or, more precisely, its common 
stockholders) with the best of both worlds. Because the instrument 
was classified as debt for tax purposes, the bank would be entitled 
to an interest deduction that could increase the after-tax return 
earned by the common stockholders.128 Because the instrument 
was classified as equity for purposes of capital requirements, the 
bank could issue the instrument in lieu of additional common 
stock, which would have diluted the ownership interest held by the 
common stockholders.129 
As mentioned, the aim of bank capital requirements is to 
reduce the risk of insolvency.130 Therefore, a substance-based 
classification scheme would categorize an instrument as equity for 
bank regulatory purposes only if the holder cannot legally enforce 
payment on the instrument—or, more precisely, only if the holder’s 
rights of enforcement are limited to the claim that the instrument 
precedes the common stock. In other words, an instrument could 
be equity if its holders have the right to require that they are paid 
before the holders of the common stock, so long as they do not have 
the right to enforce payment when no payments are made with 
respect to the common stock. Furthermore, an instrument that had 
a maturity date (or a date on which redemption was required) 
would be problematic because the bank’s failure to make the 
required payment could result in insolvency. Likely for these 
reasons, perpetual preferred stock is classified as “tier one 
capital.”131 Regulators might accept an instrument with a maturity 
date, but only if payment would be excused in circumstances in 
which there was a greater than negligible risk of insolvency.  
Based on this logic, it is difficult to see how anything that is 
properly classified as equity for purposes of bank regulatory 
                                                                                                     
 128. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (addressing a bank’s ability to 
deduct interest expense on debt for tax purposes). 
 129. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 119, at 649 (“[O]nce a bank has raised capital 
by issuing stock, the stockholders expect a return on their investment. Banks can 
increase the expected return on equity by holding more liabilities relative to their 
capital[—]that is, by increasing their leverage.”). 
 130. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the main aim of 
bank capital requirements). 
 131. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 119, at 651 (describing what constitutes “tier 
one capital”). 
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requirements could constitute debt for purposes of tax law. In tax 
law, a number of courts echo some variation of the refrain that an 
instrument is debt only if the parties intend for the holder of the 
instrument to have a definite right to be repaid a fixed amount at 
a certain time, regardless of the income of the obligor.132 As just 
discussed, something should only be equity for purposes of capital 
requirements if its holder has no definite right to payment. Thus, 
the determination that something is equity for purposes of capital 
requirements would seem to be in direct conflict with the 
conclusion that it is debt for tax purposes. 
As a practical matter, an instrument properly classified as 
equity for purposes of capital requirements might be classified as 
debt for tax purposes because courts (or the IRS) lose sight of the 
forest for the trees. The ultimate determination in tax law, 
according to a number of courts, turns on whether or not the 
parties intend for the holder of an instrument to have a definite 
right to payment.133 To determine whether the parties’ possess the 
requisite intent, courts engage in an examination of a long list of 
objective factors.134 These factors can include, among others, 
whether the issuer is thinly capitalized, the liquidity of the issuer’s 
assets, the stability of the issuer’s revenues, the terms of the 
instrument (such as the length of the term to maturity), and 
subordination of the instrument to other creditors.135 In some 
cases, courts might allow the examination of factors to supplant 
the ultimate determination, or the IRS might do the same when it 
issues administrative guidance regarding the tax classification of 
certain instruments.136 Thus, for instance, assume a bank issues 
                                                                                                     
 132. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (describing use of this 
definition of “debt” for tax purposes). 
 133. Supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (listing eight factors as among 
those that can be considered). 
 135. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing factors considered 
by courts). 
 136. In many cases, the IRS will be the source of guidance. For example, in a 
2009 Chief Counsel Advisory, the IRS determined that it should not challenge the 
taxpayer’s characterization of trust preferred securities as debt for tax purposes. 
See, e.g., I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 200932049, at 15 (Aug. 7, 2009) 
[hereinafter I.R.S. CCA Mem.]. As mentioned above, at the time, trust preferred 
securities were treated as “tier one capital” for certain banks. See supra note 39 
and accompanying text. In this CCA, the IRS did not treat the holder’s definite 
right to payment as the ultimate question. See I.R.S. CCA Mem., supra note 136, 
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an instrument that decidedly does not grant the holder a definite 
legal right to payment (so that it can be classified as equity for 
purposes of capital requirements). Further, assume the bank is not 
thinly capitalized, earns a stable stream of revenue, and holds 
significant liquid assets. Because these three factors are generally 
factors that weigh in favor of classifying an instrument as debt for 
tax purposes, a court might classify this instrument as debt, 
notwithstanding the fact that the lack of legal right to enforce 
payment would seem to undercut the conclusion that the parties 
intend for the holder to have a definite right to payment. Likewise, 
if an instrument is properly characterized as debt for tax purposes, 
bank regulators might, nevertheless, classify it as equity if they 
decide to exercise more leniency and accept some risk that the 
holders of the instrument could enforce payment, leading to 
insolvency. 
To demonstrate, imagine that a bank issues a preferred stock 
instrument and that the bank is required to redeem the 
instrument at some point in time, but not for a number of years. 
Furthermore, assume that the obligation to redeem the instrument 
would be excused in circumstances in which the bank faced 
financial difficulty. Based on an examination of various facts (such 
as the bank’s operating history and the fact that the bank is not 
thinly capitalized), facing the type of financial difficulty that would 
excuse payment is unlikely. Under this mix of facts, bank 
regulators might determine that the instrument is equity because 
the holder’s “right” to repayment does not kick in until the distant 
future and is sufficiently watered down by conditions under which 
the payment is excused. At the same time, based on other facts, 
the likelihood that payment will in fact occur is high, despite the 
fact that the holder does not have a definite legal right to payment. 
Under these facts, the IRS or the courts might determine that the 
instrument is debt for tax purposes if they focus on the likelihood 
that payment will occur, rather than focusing on the holder’s right 
to payment.137 Arguably, this method of analysis is mistaken. As 
                                                                                                     
at 10. Rather, the IRS framed the analysis as a multi-factor analysis in which the 
question: “Is there an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain on demand or 
at a fixed maturity date that is in the reasonably foreseeable future?” was but one 
of a number of factors. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 137. The Chief Counsel Advisory in which the IRS decided to not challenge a 
taxpayer’s characterization of trust preferred securities as debt for tax purposes 
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described above, the riskiness of an instrument could make a 
definite obligation to pay illusory and without substance (so that a 
risky instrument should be treated as equity even if the holder has 
a formal legal right to payment).138 On the other hand, if the terms 
of an instrument explicitly provide that the holder lacks a fully 
enforceable right to payment, then the fact that payment is likely 
should not affect a court’s analysis of whether the parties intend 
for the holder to have a definite right to payment. 
Thus, the inconsistency of instruments that are classified as 
equity for purposes of bank capital requirements, but as debt for 
tax purposes, ought to raise suspicion. In some cases, it might be a 
signal to the IRS and to courts to reconsider the instrument’s 
                                                                                                     
provides a useful illustration. See I.R.S. CCA Mem., supra note 136, at 16. In the 
CCA, the IRS stated: 
The fact that the holders of the Preferred Securities have creditor 
rights of practical significance is probative of debt. However, the 
Preferred Securities are subject to several conditions which, if 
implemented, would cause the periodic payments to be more analogous 
to traditional preferred stock dividends than to traditional interest on 
long term debt. These include the right of the Taxpayer voluntarily to 
defer payments for prolonged periods, limitations on the sources from 
which deferred payments can be satisfied, and the potential loss of a 
portion of deferred payments in the event of bankruptcy. 
Id. 
In other words, the “rights” of the holders to enforce payment are fairly weak, 
especially in case of financial difficulty, as they likely must be for the instrument 
to be treated as equity for bank regulatory purposes. In the CCA, the IRS 
continues by stating: 
The likelihood of these conditions being implemented, however, 
appears to be remote. Taxpayer has an extensive, consistent history of 
dividend payments on its common stock which it will have a 
substantial economic incentive to maintain and which would be 
prohibited if payments were deferred on the Preferred Securities. 
Taxpayer indicated that it did not intend to defer payments, and has 
sufficient capitalization, liquidity and long term business prospects to 
justify the assumption that it will be able to comply with that intention.  
Id. 
Thus, the IRS switched gears from considering the rights of the holders to receive 
payment to analyzing the likelihood that payment will occur. Based on the high 
likelihood that payment will occur, the IRS determined that it should not 
challenge the characterization of the instruments as debt for tax purposes. Id. 
 138. See supra Part IV.A (“[I]f the relevant factors suggest that an instrument 
is very risky, that determination could undercut a determination that the holder 
possessed a formal legal right to payment, so that the instrument would be 
treated as equity for tax purposes.”). 
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classification for tax purposes.139 In other cases, it might be an 
indication that the instrument is not, in fact, serving the goals of 
bank regulators.140 
D. Summary 
Although inconsistent treatment across regulatory regimes is 
not always problematic, it sometimes occurs because one or more 
of the regulatory regimes suffers from some shortcoming.141 Even 
in such a case, the inconsistency is not the problem—rather, one 
or more of the regulators has improperly applied the relevant law 
or has applied law that does not properly serve the purposes of a 
given regime.142 Thus, one of the useful implications of the 
                                                                                                     
 139. One might object to tying tax classification more closely to bank 
regulatory classification on efficiency grounds. In particular, one might argue 
that it will induce banks to issue more instruments that give the holders a definite 
right to payment so that the instrument would be debt for purposes of both 
regimes. This shift could have the detrimental effect of increasing the risk of 
insolvency. In response, two observations could be made. First, this shift could 
only occur in the case of banks that currently have issued more equity than the 
minimum required by bank regulators. Second, if the shift would increase 
insolvency risk beyond an acceptable level, then the solution is in the hands of 
bank regulators—they ought to increase the amount of required capital. See supra 
notes 119–125 and accompanying text (discussing how increased capital reduces 
the risk of insolvency). Of course, if they would not do so because of political 
pressure from regulated parties, then tying the regimes more closely together 
could have adverse effects. See Schizer, supra note 39, at 1338 
[I]t is undesirable for the tax law to create political pressure to repeal 
a helpful friction. For instance, assume that a regulated financial 
institution cannot claim a tax deduction without triggering adverse 
regulatory treatment, as when accounting losses require regulators to 
take over the institution. If this tough regulatory treatment ensures 
the solvency of regulated institutions, it would be undesirable for 
regulators to weaken their standards solely to make the tax deduction 
easier to claim. 
 140. Indeed, the classification of trust preferred securities as “tier one capital” 
for certain banks was phased out by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. See Baltali & Tanega, supra note 39, at 43 (“Given 
Dodd-Frank Act’s § 171, neither trust preferred securities nor cumulative 
perpetual preferred stock would qualify for inclusion as tier 1 capital among the 
top 50 [bank holding companies].”). 
 141. See Barry, supra note 8, at 75 (discussing how inconsistent treatment is 
not always a problem, but may be caused by inappropriate treatment by one 
regime). 
 142. See id. 
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conclusion reached by this Article is that, at the end of day, 
coordination across regulatory regimes may be unnecessary. If 
each regulator appropriately applies properly designed law, then 
any resulting inconsistency is acceptable. However, in some cases, 
inconsistency could serve as a useful flag, alerting a regulator to 
an inappropriate classification under a given regime.143 In such 
cases, coordination among regulators would be required for 
regulators to learn about inconsistent treatment and the relevant 
classification rules of other regulatory regimes, but many obstacles 
could prevent effective coordination.144 To facilitate awareness of 
inconsistent treatment, lawmakers could require regulated parties 
to file notices with relevant regulators highlighting inconsistent 
treatment.145 For instance, lawmakers could require that any 
taxpayer subject to capitalization requirements must file a 
disclosure with the IRS if any financial instrument that it issues 
is classified differently for capitalization requirements purposes 
than for tax purposes. Alternatively, regulators could share more 
general information directly with other regulators. For instance, 
bank regulators could provide the IRS aggregate data regarding 
the characteristics of instruments that are treated as “tier one 
capital” so that the IRS could consider whether those 
characteristics could be consistent with the tax classification of 
debt. 
                                                                                                     
To the extent that there is a problem, it is that one or more of these 
regimes treats the securities inappropriately. If the securities really 
represent an equity interest within the policy goals of the tax law, then 
the tax law is inappropriately treating the securities as debt; if the 
securities really represent debt within the policy goals of the banking 
regulations, then the banking regulations are incorrectly treating them 
as equity. 
 143. See id. (“The difference in treatment between regimes is an indicator that 
one of the regulatory regimes may be treating them inappropriately, but the 
difference in treatment is not a problem in and of itself.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1335–36 (discussing of some of the 
obstacles to effective coordination). 
 145. Taxpayers are required to disclose to the IRS inconsistency between tax 
and accounting treatment in some cases. See News Release, I.R.S., Treasury and 
IRS Issue Revised Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns (July, 7, 2004). 
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V. Inconsistency Nullifies a Friction 
By claiming inconsistent treatment, a sophisticated party can 
obtain a favorable tax outcome without sacrificing his or her 
non-tax regulatory goals. Thus, the ability to claim inconsistent 
treatment nullifies what could otherwise be a potent friction 
against tax planning. In particular, if the taxpayer could not claim 
inconsistent treatment, the taxpayer might abandon certain tax 
planning if it would result in significantly less advantageous 
non-tax regulatory treatment. Given the ability to claim 
inconsistent treatment, the planning can proceed undeterred. 
In some cases, moreover, a taxpayer’s efforts to obtain 
favorable non-tax regulatory treatment actually facilitate, rather 
than impede, tax planning. For instance, as discussed above, a 
taxpayer who selected a transactional form in order to obtain 
non-tax regulatory benefits will be more likely to succeed in 
disavowing that form in order to obtain a more favorable tax 
outcome than a taxpayer whose form did not produce non-tax 
benefits.146 
A. Frictions Against Tax Planning 
Others have noted that taxpayers’ aims to achieve favorable 
results under non-tax regulatory regimes can sometimes serve as 
“frictions” against tax planning.147 “Frictions” against tax planning 
                                                                                                     
 146. See supra Part II.C (discussing circumstances in which obtaining 
benefits under a non-tax regulatory regime can increase the odds of a taxpayer 
successfully disavowing his or her selected form to obtain a more favorable tax 
outcome). Another example would be the way in which attaining a favorable 
non-tax regulatory outcome can serve the role of demonstrating “business 
purpose” under the economic substance doctrine. See Lederman, Economic 
Substance, supra note 52, at 433 (“[N]on-tax regulatory requirements seem to 
provide a business purpose . . . .”). 
 147. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and 
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1253–54 (2008) 
As is well known to any tax adviser, corporate goals in one regime often 
run counter to the goals under another. Specifically, for financial 
accounting purposes corporations would typically prefer to report 
higher income, whereas for tax purposes corporations would typically 
prefer to report lower income. This can create an important “friction” 
with respect to tax planning. That is, to the extent that aggressive tax 
planning reduces income for tax and corporate purposes, the firm may 
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are non-tax costs that a taxpayer must bear in order to obtain a 
more favorable tax outcome.148 Because of such frictions, taxpayers 
will sometimes abandon attempts to structure their transactions 
to avoid adverse tax treatment if such structuring would result in 
undesirable accounting treatment, adverse non-tax regulatory 
treatment, or a sub-optimal business outcome.149 
Frictions can be a useful supplement to the tax law.150 Without 
frictions, a taxpayer might alter his or her behavior or transactions 
just enough to avoid an adverse tax outcome under a given statute 
or regulation so that the statute or regulation fails to collect the 
intended tax revenue and serves only to encourage taxpayers to 
engage in planning.151 Given the presence of frictions, taxpayers 
                                                                                                     
opt not to engage in the tax planning in the first place. 
Schizer, supra note 39, at 1328–34 (describing how legal and accounting 
constraints can act as “frictions” against tax planning). Some tax planning is 
friction-less. Field, supra note 93, at 31. In particular, a taxpayer can sometimes 
obtain a more favorable tax outcome merely by filing an election and not altering 
his or her behavior or transactions in any costly way. See id. (“[W]ith an explicit 
election (as opposed to an implicit election), taxpayers need not alter their non-tax 
economic arrangements in order to obtain favorable tax treatment. That is, 
explicit elections generally lack ‘frictions’ that impede the use of the election for 
tax minimization purposes.”). 
 148. See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS 
STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 7 (1992) (“By frictions we mean transaction 
costs incurred in the marketplace that make implementation of certain 
tax-planning strategies costly.”). Frictions could discourage not just tax planning, 
but also tax avoidance. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The 
Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 699 (2007) 
[T]he tax law often fails to extend the favorable tax treatment afforded 
particular reimbursed expenses or losses to similar but unreimbursed 
items. This distinction . . . reflects the enforcement benefits that a 
reimbursement provides—including the presence of a third party who 
implicitly has “vouched” for the bona fides of the taxpayer’s 
claim . . . . Although third parties can thus provide a type of “friction” 
that reduces tax avoidance, they do not do so in all contexts. 
 149. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1323 (“Even if a narrow rule does not 
cover a particular avoidance strategy, taxpayers will not use this “out” if key 
business and legal objectives cannot be satisfied.”); Deborah H. Schenk, An 
Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 
508–13 (2004) (discussing the effects of friction on tax planning). 
 150. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1323 (“Even if a narrow rule does not 
cover a particular avoidance strategy, taxpayers will not use this ‘out’ if key 
business and legal objectives cannot be satisfied.”). 
 151. See, e.g., id. at 1320 (“[H]alfhearted efforts [to prevent tax planning] may 
merely add to the cost of planning without deterring anyone, thereby increasing 
social waste without collecting more revenue.”). 
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will not, in some cases at least, undertake the tax planning 
required to avoid an adverse tax outcome because the planning 
would impose non-tax costs that exceed the tax benefits.152 The 
non-tax costs result from frictions, which could take the form of 
less favorable non-tax regulatory outcomes, less favorable 
accounting treatment, or sub-optimal business outcomes, for 
instance.153 
The ability of sophisticated parties to simultaneously obtain 
favorable treatment under multiple regulatory regimes can nullify 
the effects of otherwise potent frictions against tax planning.154 
Dean Schizer uses the term “malleable” to describe a friction that 
can be avoided by characterizing a transaction for tax purposes in 
a manner that differs from its accounting or other non-tax 
treatment.155 
Thus, one objection to the ability to obtain inconsistent 
treatment is that, by facilitating tax planning, inconsistent 
treatment exacerbates many of the negative ramifications of tax 
planning.156 As mentioned above, tax planning is problematic for 
three reasons, at least when it is not the type of planning that tax 
law is designed to encourage.157 First, it reduces tax revenue.158 
Second, it perpetuates unfairness as well as the perception that 
                                                                                                     
 152. See, e.g., id. at 1323–26 (describing, in general terms, when frictions will 
prevent tax planning). 
 153. See id. at 1326–34 (discussing potential frictions including the effects of 
planning on business outcome, non-tax regulatory treatment, and accounting 
treatment). 
 154. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing how inconsistent 
treatment can make it so that non-tax regulatory regimes no longer act as an 
effective friction against tax planning). 
 155. See Schizer, supra note 39, at 1324 (“Can the deal be tweaked so the 
expense no longer depresses accounting earnings, but still generates a tax 
deduction? If so, the accounting friction is malleable and will not stop the tax 
planning.”). 
 156. See id. (pointing out that malleable frictions do not stop tax planning). 
 157. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (mentioning the potential 
negative consequences of tax planning). 
 158. See id. (stating that tax revenue is lost when parties seek out beneficial 
tax outcomes). 
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the tax system is unfair.159 Third, it potentially undermines 
efficiency.160 
However, as others have noted, limitations on tax planning do 
not necessarily further efficiency.161 Sometimes limitations on tax 
planning further efficiency by prompting taxpayers to select 
transactions for non-tax reasons alone.162 However, sometimes 
limitations that foreclose certain tax planning strategies simply 
                                                                                                     
 159. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (mentioning the effects of 
tax planning on fairness and perceptions of fairness). 
 160. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (discussing the potential 
effects of tax planning on efficiency). 
 161. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and 
Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1356 (2000) 
Ultimately, the effect of any reform on the planning option turns on 
empirical questions. Some taxpayers will be stopped from 
planning . . . . This is a good result because extra revenue is collected 
without distorting taxpayer behavior. On the other hand, some 
taxpayers will change their transactions to avoid the reform . . . . In 
these cases, revenue does not increase[,] . . . while the tax rules do 
distort taxpayer behavior. The relative magnitude of these effects 
determines the reform’s overall impact on planning-related waste. 
Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 93, at 1669–70 
[W]e cannot simply interpret the models as suggesting that lines in the 
tax law should be made harder to avoid. A line can be too hard to avoid, 
at least from an efficiency perspective. This can happen because there 
are two components in the deadweight loss triangles (or marginal 
deadweight loss trapezoids): the width (reflecting elasticity) and the 
height (reflecting the size of the tax). Taxing a low-elasticity item too 
high is not optimal. We can think of these dimensions as the number 
of taxpayers that shift their behavior (the width) and the social cost 
(loss of consumer surplus) for each shift (the height). If a line is too 
hard to avoid, there may be few shifts, but each shift will have a large 
cost. Making the line easier to avoid effectively reduces the tax on an 
activity because it is cheaper to avoid the tax. This may reduce 
deadweight loss even though additional taxpayers will alter their 
behavior. 
See generally Philip A. Curry et al., Creating Failures in the Market for Tax 
Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943 (2007) (discussing how policymakers face a 
trade-off when considering measures to attack current tax planning strategies, 
namely, the trade-off between (i) costs arising from taxpayers’ use of those current 
tax planning strategies and (ii) costs arising from taxpayers’ search for new tax 
planning strategies once the existing methods are attacked). 
 162. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency 
effects of tax planning limitations). 
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cause taxpayers to shift to other, potentially even more wasteful 
tax planning strategies.163 
To demonstrate, assume that by engaging in one transaction 
(Transaction A), a taxpayer would earn, over one year, a 14% 
pre-tax return, but a 12% after-tax return. By contrast, by 
engaging in a different transaction (Transaction B) over the same 
time period, the taxpayer would earn a 15% pre-tax return, but a 
10% after-tax return. If the taxpayer engages in tax planning, he 
or she will consider tax consequences when evaluating the 
transactions and will likely opt for Transaction A because it 
maximizes the taxpayer’s private wealth. From a societal 
standpoint, however, the choice to engage in Transaction A is 
wasteful. Investing $100 in Transaction A for one year yields a 
total of $114 instead of the $115 total from Transaction B. If the 
taxpayer engaged in Transaction A, he or she will pay only $2 in 
tax for a net profit of $12. When the taxpayer engages in 
Transaction B, he or she will pay $5 in tax for a net profit of $10. 
Therefore, although Transaction A generates more individual 
wealth, the total profit from Transaction A is $1 less than the total 
profit from Transaction B. These results are summarized in Table 
1 below. 
Table 1. Numerical Example of Effects of Tax Planning 
 TRANSACTION A TRANSACTION B 
Pre-Tax Return 14% 15% 
Effective Tax Rate 14.29% 33.33% 
After-Tax Return 12% 10% 
$100 INVESTED FOR ONE YEAR: 
Total Profit $14 $15 
                                                                                                     
 163. Supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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Tax Paid $2 $5 




If certain limitations on tax planning make it so that the 
after-tax return earned by the taxpayer from Transaction A is 
lower than the after-tax return earned from Transaction B, then, 
in some cases, the taxpayer will opt for Transaction B. In those 
cases, limitations on tax planning will further the goal of efficiency. 
In other cases, limiting certain tax planning strategies could 
encourage taxpayers to refocus their efforts on even more wasteful 
strategies. For example, limitations that lower the after-tax return 
of Transaction A, in the above example, will not improve overall 
efficiency if other available, comparable transactions continue to 
yield lower pre-tax returns, but higher after-tax returns than 
Transactions A and B.164 
                                                                                                     
 164. To demonstrate this, Table 2 shows Table 1 modified to include a third 
possible transaction, Transaction C. If the results of three transactions were as 
shown in Table 2, the taxpayer would select Transaction A because it would 
generate the highest after-tax return. From a societal standpoint, this choice 
would not be optimal because Transaction A would generate a lower pre-tax 
return than Transaction B, but Transaction A would be preferable to Transaction 
C from a societal standpoint. 
TABLE 2.    
 TRANSACTION A TRANSACTION B TRANSACTION C 
Pre-Tax Return 14% 15% 13% 
Effective Tax 
Rate 




12% 10% 10.40% 
$100 INVESTED FOR ONE YEAR: 
Total Profit $14 $15 $13 
Tax Paid $2 $5 $2.60 
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What is generally true of limitations on tax planning—that 
they sometimes further efficiency, but sometimes subvert it—is 
also true of frictions against tax planning.165 For instance, a 
                                                                                                     
Profit Retained 
by Taxpayer 
$12 $10 $10.40 
 
Thus, if limitations on tax planning were to reduce the after-tax return of 
Transaction A so that it would be lower than the after-tax return earned from 
Transaction B, but if those limitations did not affect the after-tax return earned 
from Transaction C, then taxpayers could opt for Transaction C, which would be 
even more wasteful from a societal standpoint. 
 165. See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 276 (“The same frictions touted as 
beneficial in deterring wasteful planning manifest as increased transaction costs 
when the planning takes place nonetheless.”); Kane & Rock, supra note 147, at 
1254 
Whether this type of friction results in social value or social cost in the 
aggregate is ambiguous. Frictions can create value where they operate 
to bolster narrow tax provisions in curtailing wasteful tax avoidance 
behavior. But frictions can also create social costs. With respect to some 
taxpayers, for example, frictions may simply raise the cost of socially 
wasteful behavior rather than deterring it. 
Schizer, supra note 39 at 1338 
Problems can arise not only if the friction has adverse nontax effects, 
but also if it serves a useful nontax function. It would be undesirable 
for the tax law to undermine a useful friction. For instance, assume the 
relevant friction is the taxpayer’s desire for public trading. Various 
governmental efforts support public trading, such as the SEC’s 
registration of public securities and monitoring of trading practices. 
These public investments are often defended because of positive 
externalities, or the benefits that liquid markets provide to third 
parties. For instance, more accurate pricing of assets provides valuable 
guidance even for people who are not currently trading. What if the tax 
burden on publicly traded securities is raised? Ideally, the nontax 
benefits of trading would always outweigh the tax savings, so no one 
would stop trading in these markets. But, in contrast, if the tax savings 
outweigh these nontax benefits, causing taxpayers to stop trading, 
taxpayers and third parties would no longer enjoy the benefits of these 
transactions. 
Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. 
REV. 643, 658–59 (1995) (“[T]he use of such friction may be good or bad, depending 
on the ratio between deterring undesirable tax-motivated transactions on the one 
hand, and causing people to bear excess burden rather than pay tax on the 
other.”); Daniel Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the 
Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 223 (2000) [hereinafter Shaviro, Economic 
Substance] 
Evidently, then, the rationale for an economic substance approach is 
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stronger linkage of tax classification to corporate law classification 
might prevent wasteful tax planning by some taxpayers. In 
particular, some would be unwilling to sacrifice a business form 
that was optimal for corporate law purposes in order to obtain a 
more favorable tax outcome. However, some taxpayers would 
sacrifice the optimal corporate law outcome in order to obtain a 
more favorable tax outcome, undermining efficiency in those 
cases.166 For this reason, the desire to maintain a friction against 
tax planning might not justify requiring consistent treatment 
across regulatory regimes. 
B. Other Regulatory Regimes and Purpose 
As discussed above, others have argued that the goal of 
efficiency might be undermined by requiring consistent treatment 
across regulatory regimes because the resulting friction will not 
stop all tax planning, and may raise the costs of the tax planning 
that continues.167 Aside from its potential to undermine efficiency, 
                                                                                                     
that it may generate frictional impediments to certain socially 
undesirable tax planning . . . . It should be clear, therefore, that the 
desirability of an economic substance approach depends on two main 
things. The first is the social desirability of deterring optimal tax 
planning in the cases that are being addressed. The second is the 
extent to which it succeeds in generating such deterrence rather than 
simply inducing taxpayers to jump through a few extra hoops before 
getting the desired tax consequences anyway. 
 166. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 1, at 278–79 
Decoupling tax and corporate law again holds promise. In the case of 
unincorporated entities, the tax regulations have already partially 
decoupled tax from corporate law. Prior to 1996, the tax classification 
of an unincorporated entity turned on a multifactor test that included 
such corporate law attributes as limited liability, centralized 
management, unlimited life, and free transferability of interest. Under 
the check-the-box regulations, most unincorporated entities may now 
elect whether to be treated as a partnership or a corporation for tax 
purposes. We still have a corporate tax; its boundaries are now 
effectively enforced by the publicly traded partnership rules rather 
than corporate law attributes. By making the tax classification of 
unincorporated entities elective, tax no longer distorts an 
entrepreneur’s decision whether to organize as a limited partnership, 
an LLC, or whatever new entity comes next. 
 167. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (describing how some 
frictions will not stop all tax planning but will merely increase its costs). 
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use of another regulatory regime as the source of friction might not 
be ideal because it could lead to arbitrary outcomes when the other 
regulatory regime classifies transactions in a manner that is 
unrelated to the goals of tax law. In order to illustrate, consider 
the example of state usury laws. If we wanted to transform state 
usury laws into a friction that was not “malleable”—to use Dean 
Schizer’s term168—we would modify tax doctrine to provide that an 
instrument cannot be classified as debt for tax purposes unless it 
would be classified as debt for tax purposes under existing doctrine 
and also is classified as debt for state usury law purposes. State 
usury laws, however, might classify an instrument as debt or 
equity based on form (i.e., the labels assigned by the parties) or 
based on substantive factors that might have little to do with the 
goals of tax law.169 
To illustrate, assume that a state classifies instruments as 
debt or equity for usury law purposes based on the label assigned 
by the parties. Consider a taxpayer who contemplates issuing an 
instrument that would be treated as debt for tax purposes in order 
to obtain an interest deduction. But for the tax benefit obtained 
from the interest deduction, the taxpayer would not issue this 
instrument. Further, assume that if the taxpayer were only 
considering existing tax law (i.e., prior to the adoption of the usury 
law friction) and business factors, the taxpayer would issue an 
instrument that would yield X%. Assume, if the instrument were 
debt for state usury law purposes, X% would exceed the maximum 
allowable rate. Now, assume the state usury law “friction” were 
adopted so that an instrument cannot be classified as debt for tax 
purposes unless it would be classified as debt for tax purposes 
under existing doctrine and also were classified as debt for state 
usury law purposes. 
Given this change to tax law, the taxpayer could choose among 
three options: 
Option 1. The taxpayer could refrain from issuing the 
instrument entirely. 
                                                                                                     
 168. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (citing Dean Schizer’s use of 
the term “malleable” to describe frictions easily avoided by obtaining inconsistent 
treatment across regimes). 
 169. See supra Part IV.B (addressing debt and equity determinations in state 
usury law). 
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Option 2. The taxpayer could label the instrument “debt” so 
that it was debt for state usury law purposes and tax purposes. The 
taxpayer must, then, reduce the yield on the instrument to comply 
with state usury law. Furthermore, to make the reduced yield 
palatable to the holder of the instrument, the taxpayer must 
modify the terms in other ways, perhaps by providing security for 
the loan, for instance. 
Option 3. The taxpayer could label the instrument “equity” 
and retain the yield that the taxpayer originally contemplated as 
well as the other terms of the instrument. Under this option, 
however, the instrument would be treated as equity for state usury 
law purposes and, therefore, also treated as equity for tax 
purposes. Thus, the taxpayer would not be entitled to an interest 
deduction. 
In this example, the taxpayer would not select Option 3 
because the facts of this hypothetical assumed that the taxpayer’s 
only reason for issuing the instrument was to obtain an interest 
deduction for tax purposes. If the taxpayer were to select Option 1, 
then the state usury laws would have fulfilled their “friction” 
role—they would have prevented a taxpayer from engaging in a 
tax-motivated transaction. If the taxpayer were to select Option 2, 
then the taxpayer would have persisted in engaging in a 
tax-motivated transaction. The result might be more or less 
efficient than what the taxpayer had originally planned to do, 
depending on whether the modifications to the terms of the 
instrument bring the result nearer to or farther from an efficient 
outcome. 
The observations made so far demonstrate the argument that 
others have made regarding the possibility that frictions could, in 
some cases, further efficiency, but in others, undermine it.170 Aside 
from considering efficiency, I would argue it is worthwhile to 
assess whether we have served the purposes of tax doctrine. If the 
instrument that the taxpayer originally planned to issue would 
have been substantively debt without the modifications that the 
taxpayer must now make to it, then requiring that this taxpayer 
make these modifications in order to obtain debt classification 
arguably does not serve the goals of tax law. This is particularly 
                                                                                                     
 170. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (mentioning the 
potential for positive and negative effects on efficiency resulting from frictions). 
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true when we take into account the fact that not all taxpayers will 
be subject to state usury laws.171 Therefore, only some taxpayers 
would be required to comply with state usury laws in order to 
obtain an interest deduction for tax purposes.172 Thus, the need to 
modify the terms of instruments would fall arbitrarily on only 
some taxpayers.173 
To further illustrate the point, consider an example involving 
a friction that is not a non-tax regulatory regime—the rules that 
govern the tax treatment of alimony. By default, alimony 
payments are included in the income of the spouse receiving 
alimony174 and deducted by the spouse paying alimony.175 
However, when both spouses agree, the recipient may exclude the 
payments from income, and the payor does not deduct the 
payments.176 This tax treatment provides the individuals with a 
valuable tax planning opportunity, at least when the former 
spouses are subject to different effective tax rates.177 
                                                                                                     
 171. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (giving the example that 
usury laws may not apply to loans made to “sophisticated” borrowers). 
 172. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (stating that some taxpayers 
are exempt from usury laws). 
 173. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 39, at 1337 
Rules that depend on frictions can redistribute tax burdens in random 
or undesirable ways. The problem is that some taxpayers may be 
uniquely able to avoid the friction. For instance, if securities dealers 
cannot supply a particular avoidance transaction, but insurance 
companies can, a reform may transfer wealth from dealers to insurers. 
Likewise, if a tax benefit is conditioned on adverse accounting, the 
benefit may be claimed only by firms that are relatively unconcerned 
about this regime. Since indifference to the friction has little to do with 
ability to pay, normatively comparable firms will be taxed differently. 
 174. See I.R.C. § 71(a) (2012) (“Gross income includes amounts received as 
alimony.”). 
 175. See id. § 215(a) (“[T]here shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal 
to the alimony . . . paid during such individuals taxable year.”). 
 176. See id. § 71(b)(1)(B) (defining alimony as a payment that “the divorce or 
separation instrument does not designate . . . as a payment which is not included 
in gross income”). 
 177. The default rule would be advantageous if the spouse paying alimony 
were in a higher tax bracket than the spouse receiving alimony. In order to 
demonstrate, assume the payor is subject to a 35% tax rate, the recipient is 
subject to a 25% tax rate, and the amount of alimony paid is $50,000. By 
deducting alimony, the payor would incur tax liability that was $17,500 lower 
than the liability he or she would have incurred absent the deduction. At the same 
time, by including the payment in income, the recipient would become subject to 
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Furthermore, in part because of the tax treatment of alimony, 
a divorced couple could pay less in total tax liability than the 
couple would have paid while married. Imagine, for instance, that 
A and B were married. A earned $300,000 per year and B earned 
$0. As a married couple filing a joint return, ignoring the effects of 
any deductions, they would be subject to total liability of $74,413 
in 2016.178 Assume they divorce and assume A pays B $150,000 of 
alimony per year and the parties opt for the default treatment for 
alimony (deductible by A and included in B’s income). As a result, 
each would be a single taxpayer who earned $150,000 of taxable 
income per year, ignoring any deductions other than the alimony 
deduction. As such, each would be subject to total tax liability of 
$35,036.75 in 2016.179 As a result, together, they would be subject 
                                                                                                     
tax liability that was $12,500 higher than the liability to which he or she would 
have been subject without this income. Thus, the aggregate tax liability of the 
parties under the default rule would be $5,000 lower than the aggregate tax 
liability that would have resulted had the parties elected out of the default rule. 
Moreover, both spouses could share in this aggregate benefit if the spouse paying 
alimony increased the amount paid in order to shift some of the benefit of the tax 
deduction to the spouse receiving alimony. For example, assume the paying 
spouse was subject to a 35% tax rate, the receiving spouse was subject to a 25% 
tax rate, and the parties would have agreed to alimony payments of $50,000 if 
they opted out of the default treatment. Retaining the default treatment and 
increasing the amount of the payment to $70,000 would improve the economic 
position of both individuals. If the payment was $50,000 and the parties opted out 
of the default treatment, the paying spouse would incur a $50,000 after-tax loss 
(he or she would pay $50,000 and would not be entitled to a deduction). The 
receiving spouse would achieve a $50,000 after-tax gain (he or she would receive 
$50,000 and would not be subject to tax on the payment). If the payment were 
increased to $70,000 and the parties did not opt out of default treatment, the 
paying spouse would incur a $45,500 after-tax loss ($70,000 pre-tax payment 
minus $24,500 tax savings resulting from deducting the payment from income 
taxed at 35%). Thus, the paying spouse’s economic position would be improved by 
$4,500. The receiving spouse would achieve a $52,500 after-tax gain ($70,000 
payment minus $17,500 tax liability incurred as a result of taxing the payment 
at 25%). Thus, the receiving spouse’s economic position would improve by $2,500. 
For simplicity, all of the preceding calculations assume that including the 
payment in income (or deducting the payment) would not be sufficient to move 
the paying spouse or receiving spouse into a different marginal tax bracket. 
 178. For simplicity, this calculation ignores the effects of any available 
deductions. This amount is calculated as follows: 10% times $18,550 + 15% times 
($75,300 – $18,550) + 25% times ($151,900 – $75,300) + 28% times 
($231,450 – $151,900) + 33% times ($300,000 – $231,450). 
 179. For simplicity, this calculation ignores the effects of any available 
deductions. This amount is calculated as follows: 10% times $9,275 + 15% times 
($37,650 – $9,275) + 25% times ($91,150 – $37,650) + 28% times 
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to tax liability of $70,073.50, which is $4,339.50 lower than the tax 
liability they would have owed as a married couple.180 
For that reason, parties might engage in tax-motivated 
“friendly divorces” in order to obtain the tax benefit resulting from 
the tax treatment of alimony. To guard against this possibility, the 
Internal Revenue Code provides that a payment made to an 
ex-spouse cannot be alimony if the ex-spouses are members of the 
same household.181 Thus, to prevent tax-motivated, friendly 
divorces, the tax law adopts a “friction”—and likely a powerful 
friction. Namely, the parties cannot attain their tax objective 
unless they live in different homes.182 
In this case, the limitation is not merely a friction, but also 
arguably serves the underlying goals of tax law. If the ex-spouses 
do live in different homes, they more closely resemble a typical 
divorced couple in a way that is relevant to tax law. In particular, 
the maintenance of separate homes is consistent with treating the 
alimony payment as an expense of one spouse (given that the 
payment funds a household of which he or she is not a part) and 
income earned by the other spouse. 
To further demonstrate the point, one could imagine a 
hypothetical alternative to the current rule. In particular, imagine 
that the Internal Revenue Code were to provide that if ex-spouses 
are members of the same household, a payment can be alimony 
only if the spouses refrain from watching television for the entire 
year. This restriction could also serve as a friction against 
tax-motivated, friendly divorces. 
Under either current law or the hypothetical alternative, some 
couples might engage in friendly divorces notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                     
($150,000 – $91,150). 
 180. This is also less than the tax liability they would owe if they were never 
married. In that case, A, as a single taxpayer with taxable income of $300,000 
would owe tax liability of $82,529,25. This amount is calculated as follows: 
10% times $9,275 + 15% times ($37,650 – $9,275) + 25% times 
($91,150 – $37,650) + 28% times ($190,150 – $91,150) + 33% times 
($300,000 – $190,150). B, as a single taxpayer with $0 taxable income would owe 
$0 in tax liability. Thus, their total tax liability would be $82,529. For simplicity, 
these calculations ignore the effects of any deductions.  
 181. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) (2012) (requiring that the payee spouse and the 
payor spouse are not members of the same household at the time of the alimony 
payment). 
 182. Id. 
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friction.183 Under current law, however, if the couple does proceed 
with the divorce, they will resemble the typical divorced couple in 
a way that might justify the tax treatment of alimony.184 In the 
case of the hypothetical alternative, the couple does not resemble 
the typical divorced couple in any relevant way. Therefore, they 
obtain tax treatment that is essentially arbitrary. 
In summary, the ability to obtain inconsistent treatment 
across regulatory regimes neutralizes a potential friction and 
potentially facilitates tax planning. However, that result might be 
a lesser evil than the alternative of making the friction less 
avoidable. If the friction were less avoidable, some taxpayers would 
still engage in tax planning and bear the costs resulting from the 
friction. This potentially contributes to inefficiency. Furthermore, 
when the goals of the non-tax regulatory regime are unrelated to 
the goals of tax law, using the regime to create a friction produces 
arbitrary outcomes that do not serve the underlying purposes of 
tax doctrine. 
C. Addressing Counter-Arguments 
In the preceding Part, I have argued that a non-tax regulatory 
regime does not serve well as a friction against tax planning when 
the purpose of the regime is not aligned with purpose of the 
relevant tax rules, because those who engage in tax planning 
despite the friction will be taxed in an arbitrary manner that is 
inconsistent with the relevant tax provision’s purpose.185 Two 
objections might be raised in response, and each objection is 
discussed and addressed below. 
                                                                                                     
 183. Imagine a married couple that already needed to maintain separate 
homes because each spouse worked in a different part of the country. One could 
imagine this couple conceivably engaging in a “friendly divorce” because they 
might not view the separate homes requirement as an impediment. 
 184. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text (describing the default 
tax treatment of alimony as included in gross income by the receiving spouse and 
allowable as a deduction by the paying spouse). 
 185. See supra Part V.B (providing examples of potential arbitrary outcomes 
in such circumstances). 
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1. The Argument Misses the Point of Frictions 
One might object to the consideration of purpose on the 
grounds that, conceptually, frictions are merely useful tools to 
hinder tax planning, and that frictions need not have anything to 
do with tax law or its goals. In other words, one might argue that 
the only thing that matters is the end result—planning around tax 
rules is discouraged.186 
When the friction stops tax planning, this may be true. When 
tax planning occurs despite the friction, then we should care about 
what the friction requires. Consider, for instance, the hypothetical 
alternative friction against friendly divorces described above.187 In 
                                                                                                     
 186. See, e.g., Leigh Osofksy, Who’s Naughty and Who’s Nice? Frictions, 
Screening, and Tax Law Design, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2013) 
According to this theory [of frictions against tax planning], tax law 
relies on frictions, or nontax costs, in order to make tax planning more 
expensive. The goal is to deter these transactions, which are viewed as 
socially wasteful. Under this theory, at least with respect to the tax 
law, a friction serves no useful role, other than to deter the tax 
planning . . . . This focus on the deterrence aspect of frictions has 
caused scholars to generally agree upon two pieces of conventional 
wisdom regarding frictions. Good frictions should (1) deter tax 
planning rather than cause it to continue in a more wasteful fashion, 
and (2) not impose costs on regular business transactions. 
Professor Osofsky observes that frictions can also serve a screening function. See 
id. at 1058 (“I argue that frictions serve a more extensive and complex role than 
has been recognized previously. Although not focused on in the tax literature, 
frictions function first as screening mechanisms, by tracking underlying 
characteristics of taxpayers and imposing different costs on different groups.”); 
see also Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (2008) (“Forcing taxpayers to bear risk has no 
connection to income measurement or any other fundamental goal of our tax 
system. It is just a friction—a cost imposed on taxpayers to prevent them from 
escaping tax, primarily on capital income.”); Shaviro, Economic Substance, supra 
note 165, at 222 
From this perspective, economic substance is just a tool for 
accomplishing aims that have little to do with how one might define it 
as a matter of internal logic . . . . [O]ne might as well condition 
favorable tax consequences on whether the taxpayer’s chief financial 
officer can execute 20 back-somersaults in the IRS National Office at 
midnight on April Fool’s Day, if such a requirement turns out to 
achieve a better ratio of successful deterrence to inducing wasteful 
effort in meeting requirements that are pointless in themselves. 
 187. The hypothetical alternative involved imagining that the Internal 
Revenue Code were to provide that if ex-spouses are members of the same 
household, a payment can be alimony only if the spouses refrain from watching 
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cases in which it prevents taxpayers from engaging in 
tax-motivated divorces, the arbitrariness of the rule arguably does 
not matter. However, in cases in which the tax-motivated divorces 
continue, an arbitrary friction leads to arbitrary outcomes. 
2. Purpose is Indeterminate 
One might also object to the consideration of purpose based on 
the view that purpose is indeterminate and, therefore, cannot 
provide a useful guide regarding whether a friction is or is not 
desirable. To take the example of the determination of whether an 
instrument is debt or equity for tax purposes, treating debt 
differently from equity does not serve any clear underlying 
purpose.188 Therefore, we cannot judge whether a friction serves or 
undercuts the underlying purpose given that there is no such 
thing. 
To clarify, I am not using the terms “purpose” of tax law or 
“goals” of tax law to refer to underlying normative goals. I 
acknowledge that what I have labeled “purpose” or “goals” might 
be labeled, more accurately, as existing tax law doctrine or 
consistent application of precedent. For instance, when judging 
whether it is appropriate to treat an instrument as equity for bank 
capital requirements, but debt for tax purposes, I have argued 
above that this determination depends on whether or not the 
holder of the instrument has a definite right to payment so that 
the instrument is properly classified as debt for tax purposes.189 I 
am not asserting that classifying an instrument differently when 
the holder has a definite right to payment furthers a fundamental, 
underlying policy of tax law. Rather, I am arguing that the courts 
have held that a definite right to payment is the defining 
                                                                                                     
television for the entire year. 
 188. See, e.g., Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 93, at 1638 
As with the realization requirement, one cannot use the underlying 
purpose behind the debt-equity distinction to draw the line [between 
debt and equity] . . . . Given this lack of normative content for the 
corporate tax, it is difficult to determine the appropriate debt-equity 
boundary by reference to the underlying goals. 
 189. See supra Part IV.C (observing that existing tax doctrine provides that 
an instrument is debt for tax purposes when the holder has a definite right to 
payment). 
1950 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1895 (2017) 
characteristic of debt. Therefore, given the tax law that exists, 
instruments should be classified in a manner that is consistent 
with this doctrine. 
One might respond that doctrine can always change.190 That 
is certainly true; however, if a change to tax doctrine is desirable, 
then for reasons of transparency, it ought to be initiated directly, 
rather than indirectly by requiring taxpayers to make changes for 
purposes of other regulatory regimes. For example, consider the 
illustration above regarding state usury law and tax law.191 
Imagine the regimes were linked so that an instrument could only 
be classified as debt for tax purposes if the instrument would be 
classified as debt under existing tax doctrine and also is classified 
as debt for state usury law purposes. Under this new regime, some 
taxpayers that were subject to state usury laws might modify the 
terms of instruments that would have been debt for tax purposes 
without this change.192 In particular, taxpayers might reduce the 
yield on the instrument to comply with state usury laws and make 
other changes (such as providing security for the loan) to make the 
reduced yield palatable to the instrument’s holder. Certainly, 
these changes (a reduced yield and additional security) make the 
                                                                                                     
 190. Furthermore, in some cases, existing doctrine perhaps should change if 
it does not best serve underlying policy goals. See, e.g., Weisbach, Line Drawing, 
supra note 93, at 1643–44 
The typical approach to line drawing is platonic. It searches for the 
essential meaning of words, such as corporation, partnership, debt, 
equity, selling, or holding, and draws lines accordingly. For 
example, . . . the current doctrine distinguishing debt and equity looks 
to the typical features of “debt” and “equity.” The platonic approach 
fails as a general method of drawing lines. The platonic or essentialist 
notions contained in doctrinal rules are not tied to values that a tax 
system should promote. Tax doctrines do not, for example, draw lines 
that necessarily make the system more equitable, more efficient, or 
more administratively feasible. Moreover, platonic approaches cannot 
be defended on pragmatic grounds because the words themselves do 
not have readily accessible meanings. The effect is that the platonic 
approach does not make the system more certain. 
 191. See supra Part IV.B (discussing circumstances in which an instrument 
could be classified as debt for tax purposes, but equity for state usury law 
purposes). 
 192. See supra Part IV.B (discussing how, under such a regime, taxpayers 
who wanted to issue an instrument that was treated as debt for tax purposes 
might reduce the yield on the instrument to comply with state usury laws and 
make other changes so that the reduced yield was acceptable to the instrument’s 
holder). 
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instrument more debt-like. However, if courts did not think the 
instrument was sufficiently debt-like without the changes to 
obtain classification as debt for tax purposes, then they ought to 
reach that conclusion directly, holding that an instrument with the 
original features was equity for tax purposes. Such an approach 
would be more transparent, and it would apply across the board to 
all taxpayers and not merely to taxpayers who needed to modify 
the terms of an instrument to comply with state usury laws.  
VI. Conclusion 
Sophisticated parties frequently structure their transactions 
to simultaneously obtain beneficial treatment under multiple 
regulatory regimes, sometimes by designing a given transaction so 
that it is classified differently for purposes of different regimes.193 
For example, a bank might issue an instrument treated as debt for 
tax purposes, but categorized as equity for purposes of capital 
requirements imposed by bank regulators. 
Inconsistency across regulatory regimes is not necessarily 
problematic.194 Different regulatory regimes can serve different 
purposes so that, in some cases, inconsistent treatment across the 
regimes is perfectly consistent with the goals of each regime.195 
Moreover, when the regimes serve different purposes, requiring 
consistent treatment across the regimes could undercut the goals 
of one or more of the regimes.196 For instance, requiring that the 
tax classification of a given transaction must not differ from its 
classification for purposes of some other regime, in order to impose 
a friction against tax planning, could undercut the goals of tax law 
and result in arbitrary tax outcomes.197 
                                                                                                     
 193. See supra Part II.A (presenting examples of inconsistent treatment). 
 194. See supra Part III (arguing that inconsistency is not necessarily 
problematic). 
 195. See supra Part III (noting that inconsistency may arise from the fact that 
different regimes serve different goals). 
 196. See supra Part III (noting that if different regimes serve different goals, 
then it might be necessary to classify a transaction differently for purposes of each 
regime to avoid a true inconsistency). 
 197. See supra Part V.B (providing examples of how requiring consistent 
treatment could produce arbitrary results). 
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In other cases, however, inconsistency could represent a 
byproduct of incorrect classification by one or more of the 
regimes.198 Even in such cases, the inconsistency itself is not what 
is objectionable.199 Rather, the defect is simply the failure of one 
(or more) of the regimes to classify the transaction in a manner 
that best serves the goals of that regime.200 
                                                                                                     
 198. See supra Part IV (illustrating that inconsistency could be a byproduct 
of a failing in one or more regulatory regimes). 
 199. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (explaining how the problem 
in such a case is not inconsistency but is instead a failing by one or more of the 
regimes).  
 200. Id.  
